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Can self-representationalism explain away the apparent irreducibility of consciousness?
Kriegel’s self-representationalist (SR) theory of phenomenal consciousness pursues two projects. The first is to offer a positive account of how conscious experience arises from physical brain processes. The second is to explain why consciousness misleadingly appears to be irreducible to the physica...
Autor principal: | McClelland, Tom |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Springer Netherlands
2015
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4946870/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27471329 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0806-1 |
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