Attack Vulnerability of Network Controllability

Controllability of complex networks has attracted much attention, and understanding the robustness of network controllability against potential attacks and failures is of practical significance. In this paper, we systematically investigate the attack vulnerability of network controllability for the canonical model networks as well as the real-world networks subject to attacks on nodes and edges. The attack strategies are selected based on degree and betweenness centralities calculated for either the initial network or the current network during the removal, among which random failure is as a comparison. It is found that the node-based strategies are often more harmful to the network controllability than the edge-based ones, and so are the recalculated strategies than their counterparts. The Barabási-Albert scale-free model, which has a highly biased structure, proves to be the most vulnerable of the tested model networks. In contrast, the Erdős-Rényi random model, which lacks structural bias, exhibits much better robustness to both node-based and edge-based attacks. We also survey the control robustness of 25 real-world networks, and the numerical results show that most real networks are control robust to random node failures, which has not been observed in the model networks. And the recalculated betweenness-based strategy is the most efficient way to harm the controllability of real-world networks. Besides, we find that the edge degree is not a good quantity to measure the importance of an edge in terms of network controllability.