Monopolizing Sanctioning Power under Noise Eliminates Perverse Punishment But Does Not Increase Cooperation

We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information in a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. Under perfect and extremely noisy information, aggregate behavior does not differ between institutions. Under intermediate noise, punishment...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Fischer, Sven, Grechenig, Kristoffel, Meier, Nicolas
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Frontiers Media S.A. 2016
Materias:
Neuroscience
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5040719/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27746725
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2016.00180
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author Fischer, Sven
Grechenig, Kristoffel
Meier, Nicolas
author_facet Fischer, Sven
Grechenig, Kristoffel
Meier, Nicolas
author_sort Fischer, Sven
collection PubMed
description We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information in a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. Under perfect and extremely noisy information, aggregate behavior does not differ between institutions. Under intermediate noise, punishment escalates in the decentralized peer-to-peer punishment regime which badly affects efficiency while sustaining cooperation for longer. Only decentralized punishment is often directed at cooperators (perverse punishment). We report several, sometimes subtle, differences in punishment behavior, and how contributions react.
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spelling pubmed-50407192016-10-14 Monopolizing Sanctioning Power under Noise Eliminates Perverse Punishment But Does Not Increase Cooperation Fischer, Sven Grechenig, Kristoffel Meier, Nicolas Front Behav Neurosci Neuroscience We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information in a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. Under perfect and extremely noisy information, aggregate behavior does not differ between institutions. Under intermediate noise, punishment escalates in the decentralized peer-to-peer punishment regime which badly affects efficiency while sustaining cooperation for longer. Only decentralized punishment is often directed at cooperators (perverse punishment). We report several, sometimes subtle, differences in punishment behavior, and how contributions react. Frontiers Media S.A. 2016-09-29 /pmc/articles/PMC5040719/ /pubmed/27746725 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2016.00180 Text en Copyright © 2016 Fischer, Grechenig and Meier. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
spellingShingle Neuroscience
Fischer, Sven
Grechenig, Kristoffel
Meier, Nicolas
Monopolizing Sanctioning Power under Noise Eliminates Perverse Punishment But Does Not Increase Cooperation
title Monopolizing Sanctioning Power under Noise Eliminates Perverse Punishment But Does Not Increase Cooperation
title_full Monopolizing Sanctioning Power under Noise Eliminates Perverse Punishment But Does Not Increase Cooperation
title_fullStr Monopolizing Sanctioning Power under Noise Eliminates Perverse Punishment But Does Not Increase Cooperation
title_full_unstemmed Monopolizing Sanctioning Power under Noise Eliminates Perverse Punishment But Does Not Increase Cooperation
title_short Monopolizing Sanctioning Power under Noise Eliminates Perverse Punishment But Does Not Increase Cooperation
title_sort monopolizing sanctioning power under noise eliminates perverse punishment but does not increase cooperation
topic Neuroscience
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5040719/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27746725
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2016.00180
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