Monopolizing Sanctioning Power under Noise Eliminates Perverse Punishment But Does Not Increase Cooperation

We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information in a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. Under perfect and extremely noisy information, aggregate behavior does not differ between institutions. Under intermediate noise, punishment...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Fischer, Sven, Grechenig, Kristoffel, Meier, Nicolas
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Frontiers Media S.A. 2016
Materias:
Neuroscience
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5040719/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27746725
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2016.00180

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5040719/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27746725
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2016.00180

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