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Monopolizing Sanctioning Power under Noise Eliminates Perverse Punishment But Does Not Increase Cooperation
We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information in a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. Under perfect and extremely noisy information, aggregate behavior does not differ between institutions. Under intermediate noise, punishment...
Autores principales: | Fischer, Sven, Grechenig, Kristoffel, Meier, Nicolas |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5040719/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27746725 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2016.00180 |
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