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Evolution of gossip-based indirect reciprocity on a bipartite network
Cooperation can be supported by indirect reciprocity via reputation. Thanks to gossip, reputations are built and circulated and humans can identify defectors and ostracise them. However, the evolutionary stability of gossip is allegedly undermined by the fact that it is more error-prone that direct...
Autores principales: | Giardini, Francesca, Vilone, Daniele |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5122853/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27885256 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep37931 |
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