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Solving the second-order free rider problem in a public goods game: An experiment using a leader support system
Punishment of non-cooperators—free riders—can lead to high cooperation in public goods games (PGG). However, second-order free riders, who do not pay punishment costs, reduce the effectiveness of punishment. Here we introduce a “leader support system,” in which one group leader can freely punish gro...
Autores principales: | Ozono, Hiroki, Jin, Nobuhito, Watabe, Motoki, Shimizu, Kazumi |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5146942/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27934871 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep38349 |
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