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Synthetic biology approaches to biological containment: pre-emptively tackling potential risks

Biocontainment comprises any strategy applied to ensure that harmful organisms are confined to controlled laboratory conditions and not allowed to escape into the environment. Genetically engineered microorganisms (GEMs), regardless of the nature of the modification and how it was established, have...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Torres, Leticia, Krüger, Antje, Csibra, Eszter, Gianni, Edoardo, Pinheiro, Vitor B.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Portland Press Limited 2016
Materias:
52
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5264511/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27903826
http://dx.doi.org/10.1042/EBC20160013
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author Torres, Leticia
Krüger, Antje
Csibra, Eszter
Gianni, Edoardo
Pinheiro, Vitor B.
author_facet Torres, Leticia
Krüger, Antje
Csibra, Eszter
Gianni, Edoardo
Pinheiro, Vitor B.
author_sort Torres, Leticia
collection PubMed
description Biocontainment comprises any strategy applied to ensure that harmful organisms are confined to controlled laboratory conditions and not allowed to escape into the environment. Genetically engineered microorganisms (GEMs), regardless of the nature of the modification and how it was established, have potential human or ecological impact if accidentally leaked or voluntarily released into a natural setting. Although all evidence to date is that GEMs are unable to compete in the environment, the power of synthetic biology to rewrite life requires a pre-emptive strategy to tackle possible unknown risks. Physical containment barriers have proven effective but a number of strategies have been developed to further strengthen biocontainment. Research on complex genetic circuits, lethal genes, alternative nucleic acids, genome recoding and synthetic auxotrophies aim to design more effective routes towards biocontainment. Here, we describe recent advances in synthetic biology that contribute to the ongoing efforts to develop new and improved genetic, semantic, metabolic and mechanistic plans for the containment of GEMs.
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spelling pubmed-52645112017-01-27 Synthetic biology approaches to biological containment: pre-emptively tackling potential risks Torres, Leticia Krüger, Antje Csibra, Eszter Gianni, Edoardo Pinheiro, Vitor B. Essays Biochem 52 Biocontainment comprises any strategy applied to ensure that harmful organisms are confined to controlled laboratory conditions and not allowed to escape into the environment. Genetically engineered microorganisms (GEMs), regardless of the nature of the modification and how it was established, have potential human or ecological impact if accidentally leaked or voluntarily released into a natural setting. Although all evidence to date is that GEMs are unable to compete in the environment, the power of synthetic biology to rewrite life requires a pre-emptive strategy to tackle possible unknown risks. Physical containment barriers have proven effective but a number of strategies have been developed to further strengthen biocontainment. Research on complex genetic circuits, lethal genes, alternative nucleic acids, genome recoding and synthetic auxotrophies aim to design more effective routes towards biocontainment. Here, we describe recent advances in synthetic biology that contribute to the ongoing efforts to develop new and improved genetic, semantic, metabolic and mechanistic plans for the containment of GEMs. Portland Press Limited 2016-11-30 2016-11-30 /pmc/articles/PMC5264511/ /pubmed/27903826 http://dx.doi.org/10.1042/EBC20160013 Text en © 2016 The Author(s) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open access article published by Portland Press Limited on behalf of the Biochemical Society and distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution Licence 4.0 (CC BY) (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) .
spellingShingle 52
Torres, Leticia
Krüger, Antje
Csibra, Eszter
Gianni, Edoardo
Pinheiro, Vitor B.
Synthetic biology approaches to biological containment: pre-emptively tackling potential risks
title Synthetic biology approaches to biological containment: pre-emptively tackling potential risks
title_full Synthetic biology approaches to biological containment: pre-emptively tackling potential risks
title_fullStr Synthetic biology approaches to biological containment: pre-emptively tackling potential risks
title_full_unstemmed Synthetic biology approaches to biological containment: pre-emptively tackling potential risks
title_short Synthetic biology approaches to biological containment: pre-emptively tackling potential risks
title_sort synthetic biology approaches to biological containment: pre-emptively tackling potential risks
topic 52
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5264511/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27903826
http://dx.doi.org/10.1042/EBC20160013
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