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Processing of fair and unfair offers in the ultimatum game under social observation
Social context influences social decisions and outcome processing, partially depending on inter-individual differences. The present study investigated social context-dependent modulation of behavior and feedback processing in the ultimatum game (UG) in relation to inter-individual differences in soc...
Autores principales: | , , , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2017
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5343487/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28276510 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep44062 |
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author | Peterburs, Jutta Voegler, Rolf Liepelt, Roman Schulze, Anna Wilhelm, Saskia Ocklenburg, Sebastian Straube, Thomas |
author_facet | Peterburs, Jutta Voegler, Rolf Liepelt, Roman Schulze, Anna Wilhelm, Saskia Ocklenburg, Sebastian Straube, Thomas |
author_sort | Peterburs, Jutta |
collection | PubMed |
description | Social context influences social decisions and outcome processing, partially depending on inter-individual differences. The present study investigated social context-dependent modulation of behavior and feedback processing in the ultimatum game (UG) in relation to inter-individual differences in social anxiety. Thirty-two healthy adults completed the UG both under social observation and without observation. Offers were allegedly either randomly generated by the computer or drawn from a pool of offers from previous human players. Overall, fewer unfair than fair offers were accepted. Observation decreased acceptance rates for unfair offers. The feedback-locked feedback-related negativity (FRN) but not the P3 was modulated by observation and fairness, with stronger differential coding of unfair/fair under observation. This effect was strongly correlated with individual levels of social anxiety, with higher levels associated with stronger differential fairness coding in the FRN under observation. Behavioral findings support negative reciprocity in the UG, suggesting that (implicit) social norms overwrite explicit task instructions even in the absence of (alleged) social interaction. Observation enhances this effect. Fairness coding in the FRN was modulated by observation as a function of social anxiety, supporting the notion that altered sensitivity to equality in a social context may contribute to social avoidance in socially anxious individuals. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-5343487 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2017 |
publisher | Nature Publishing Group |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-53434872017-03-14 Processing of fair and unfair offers in the ultimatum game under social observation Peterburs, Jutta Voegler, Rolf Liepelt, Roman Schulze, Anna Wilhelm, Saskia Ocklenburg, Sebastian Straube, Thomas Sci Rep Article Social context influences social decisions and outcome processing, partially depending on inter-individual differences. The present study investigated social context-dependent modulation of behavior and feedback processing in the ultimatum game (UG) in relation to inter-individual differences in social anxiety. Thirty-two healthy adults completed the UG both under social observation and without observation. Offers were allegedly either randomly generated by the computer or drawn from a pool of offers from previous human players. Overall, fewer unfair than fair offers were accepted. Observation decreased acceptance rates for unfair offers. The feedback-locked feedback-related negativity (FRN) but not the P3 was modulated by observation and fairness, with stronger differential coding of unfair/fair under observation. This effect was strongly correlated with individual levels of social anxiety, with higher levels associated with stronger differential fairness coding in the FRN under observation. Behavioral findings support negative reciprocity in the UG, suggesting that (implicit) social norms overwrite explicit task instructions even in the absence of (alleged) social interaction. Observation enhances this effect. Fairness coding in the FRN was modulated by observation as a function of social anxiety, supporting the notion that altered sensitivity to equality in a social context may contribute to social avoidance in socially anxious individuals. Nature Publishing Group 2017-03-09 /pmc/articles/PMC5343487/ /pubmed/28276510 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep44062 Text en Copyright © 2017, The Author(s) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if the material is not included under the Creative Commons license, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to reproduce the material. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
spellingShingle | Article Peterburs, Jutta Voegler, Rolf Liepelt, Roman Schulze, Anna Wilhelm, Saskia Ocklenburg, Sebastian Straube, Thomas Processing of fair and unfair offers in the ultimatum game under social observation |
title | Processing of fair and unfair offers in the ultimatum game under social observation |
title_full | Processing of fair and unfair offers in the ultimatum game under social observation |
title_fullStr | Processing of fair and unfair offers in the ultimatum game under social observation |
title_full_unstemmed | Processing of fair and unfair offers in the ultimatum game under social observation |
title_short | Processing of fair and unfair offers in the ultimatum game under social observation |
title_sort | processing of fair and unfair offers in the ultimatum game under social observation |
topic | Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5343487/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28276510 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep44062 |
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