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Social cycling and conditional responses in the Rock-Paper-Scissors game
How humans make decisions in non-cooperative strategic interactions is a big question. For the fundamental Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) model game system, classic Nash equilibrium (NE) theory predicts that players randomize completely their action choices to avoid being exploited, while evolutionary ga...
Autores principales: | Wang, Zhijian, Xu, Bin, Zhou, Hai-Jun |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2014
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5376050/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25060115 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep05830 |
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