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The role of institutional incentives and the exemplar in promoting cooperation
People on average do not play their individually rational Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy in game experiments based on the public goods game (PGG) that model social dilemmas. Differences from NE behavior have also been observed in PGG experiments that include incentives to cooperate, especially when...
Autores principales: | Wu, Jia-Jia, Li, Cong, Zhang, Bo-Yu, Cressman, Ross, Tao, Yi |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2014
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5377375/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25242265 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep06421 |
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