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War or Peace? How the Subjective Perception of Great Power Interdependence Shapes Preemptive Defensive Aggression

Why do great powers with benign intentions end up fighting each other in wars they do not seek? We utilize an incentivized, two-person “Preemptive Strike Game” (PSG) to explore how the subjective perception of great power interdependence shapes defensive aggression against persons from rival great p...

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Autores principales: Jing, Yiming, Gries, Peter H., Li, Yang, Stivers, Adam W., Mifune, Nobuhiro, Kuhlman, D. M., Bai, Liying
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Frontiers Media S.A. 2017
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5455139/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28626433
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00864
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author Jing, Yiming
Gries, Peter H.
Li, Yang
Stivers, Adam W.
Mifune, Nobuhiro
Kuhlman, D. M.
Bai, Liying
author_facet Jing, Yiming
Gries, Peter H.
Li, Yang
Stivers, Adam W.
Mifune, Nobuhiro
Kuhlman, D. M.
Bai, Liying
author_sort Jing, Yiming
collection PubMed
description Why do great powers with benign intentions end up fighting each other in wars they do not seek? We utilize an incentivized, two-person “Preemptive Strike Game” (PSG) to explore how the subjective perception of great power interdependence shapes defensive aggression against persons from rival great powers. In Study 1, college students from the United States (N = 115), China (N = 106), and Japan (N = 99) made PSG decisions facing each other. This natural experiment revealed that Chinese and Japanese participants (a) made more preemptive attacks against each other and Americans than against their compatriots, and that (b) greater preexisting perceptions of bilateral competition increased intergroup attack rates. In Study 2, adult Americans (N = 127) watched real CNN expert interviews portraying United States–China economic interdependence as more positive or negative. This randomized experiment revealed that the more positive portrayal reduced preemptive American strikes against Chinese (but not Japanese), while the more negative portrayal amplified American anger about China’s rise, increasing preemptive attacks against Chinese. We also found, however, that preemptive strikes were primarily defensive and not offensive. Interventions to reduce defensive aggression and promote great power peace are discussed.
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spelling pubmed-54551392017-06-16 War or Peace? How the Subjective Perception of Great Power Interdependence Shapes Preemptive Defensive Aggression Jing, Yiming Gries, Peter H. Li, Yang Stivers, Adam W. Mifune, Nobuhiro Kuhlman, D. M. Bai, Liying Front Psychol Psychology Why do great powers with benign intentions end up fighting each other in wars they do not seek? We utilize an incentivized, two-person “Preemptive Strike Game” (PSG) to explore how the subjective perception of great power interdependence shapes defensive aggression against persons from rival great powers. In Study 1, college students from the United States (N = 115), China (N = 106), and Japan (N = 99) made PSG decisions facing each other. This natural experiment revealed that Chinese and Japanese participants (a) made more preemptive attacks against each other and Americans than against their compatriots, and that (b) greater preexisting perceptions of bilateral competition increased intergroup attack rates. In Study 2, adult Americans (N = 127) watched real CNN expert interviews portraying United States–China economic interdependence as more positive or negative. This randomized experiment revealed that the more positive portrayal reduced preemptive American strikes against Chinese (but not Japanese), while the more negative portrayal amplified American anger about China’s rise, increasing preemptive attacks against Chinese. We also found, however, that preemptive strikes were primarily defensive and not offensive. Interventions to reduce defensive aggression and promote great power peace are discussed. Frontiers Media S.A. 2017-06-02 /pmc/articles/PMC5455139/ /pubmed/28626433 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00864 Text en Copyright © 2017 Jing, Gries, Li, Stivers, Mifune, Kuhlman and Bai. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
spellingShingle Psychology
Jing, Yiming
Gries, Peter H.
Li, Yang
Stivers, Adam W.
Mifune, Nobuhiro
Kuhlman, D. M.
Bai, Liying
War or Peace? How the Subjective Perception of Great Power Interdependence Shapes Preemptive Defensive Aggression
title War or Peace? How the Subjective Perception of Great Power Interdependence Shapes Preemptive Defensive Aggression
title_full War or Peace? How the Subjective Perception of Great Power Interdependence Shapes Preemptive Defensive Aggression
title_fullStr War or Peace? How the Subjective Perception of Great Power Interdependence Shapes Preemptive Defensive Aggression
title_full_unstemmed War or Peace? How the Subjective Perception of Great Power Interdependence Shapes Preemptive Defensive Aggression
title_short War or Peace? How the Subjective Perception of Great Power Interdependence Shapes Preemptive Defensive Aggression
title_sort war or peace? how the subjective perception of great power interdependence shapes preemptive defensive aggression
topic Psychology
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5455139/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28626433
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00864
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