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Kriegel on the Phenomenology of Action
I focus on Uriah Kriegel’s account of conative phenomenology. I agree with Kriegel’s argument that some conative phenomenology is primitive in that some conative phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to another kind of property (e.g., perceptual or cognitive). I disagree, however, with Kriegel’s s...
Autor principal: | Shepherd, Joshua |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5612388/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28955439 http://dx.doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2016.0026 |
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