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Punishing second-order free riders before first-order free riders: The effect of pool punishment priority on cooperation
Second-order free riders, who do not owe punishment cost to first-order free riders in public goods games, lead to low cooperation. Previous studies suggest that for stable cooperation, it is critical to have a pool punishment system with second-order punishment, which gathers resources from group m...
Autores principales: | Ozono, Hiroki, Kamijo, Yoshio, Shimizu, Kazumi |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group UK
2017
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5662696/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29084975 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-13918-8 |
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