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Stochastic evolutionary voluntary public goods game with punishment in a Quasi-birth-and-death process
Traditional replication dynamic model and the corresponding concept of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) only takes into account whether the system can return to the equilibrium after being subjected to a small disturbance. In the real world, due to continuous noise, the ESS of the system may not b...
Autores principales: | Quan, Ji, Liu, Wei, Chu, Yuqing, Wang, Xianjia |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group UK
2017
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5700967/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29170523 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-16140-8 |
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