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Recycling Pricing and Coordination of WEEE Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Consumers’ Bargaining

Environmentally friendly handling and efficient recycling of waste electrical on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) have grown to be a global social problem. As holders of WEEE, consumers have a significant effect on the recycling process. A consideration of and attention to the influe...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Zhu, Xiaodong, Wang, Jing, Tang, Juan
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2017
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5750996/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29244778
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph14121578
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author Zhu, Xiaodong
Wang, Jing
Tang, Juan
author_facet Zhu, Xiaodong
Wang, Jing
Tang, Juan
author_sort Zhu, Xiaodong
collection PubMed
description Environmentally friendly handling and efficient recycling of waste electrical on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) have grown to be a global social problem. As holders of WEEE, consumers have a significant effect on the recycling process. A consideration of and attention to the influence of consumer behavior in the recycling process can help achieve more effective recycling of WEEE. In this paper, we built a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain model composed of manufacturers, retailers, and network recycling platforms. Based on the influence of customer bargaining behavior, we studied several different scenarios of centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making, and contract coordination, using the Stackelberg game theory. The results show that retailers and network recycling platforms will reduce the direct recovery prices to maintain their own profit when considering the impact of consumer bargaining behavior, while remanufacturers will improve the transfer payment price for surrendering part of the profit under revenue and the expense sharing contract. Using this contract, we can achieve supply chain coordination and eliminate the effect of consumer bargaining behavior on supply chain performance. It can be viewed from the parameter sensitivity analysis that when we select the appropriate sharing coefficient, the closed-loop supply chain can achieve the same system performance under a centralized decision.
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spelling pubmed-57509962018-01-10 Recycling Pricing and Coordination of WEEE Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Consumers’ Bargaining Zhu, Xiaodong Wang, Jing Tang, Juan Int J Environ Res Public Health Article Environmentally friendly handling and efficient recycling of waste electrical on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) have grown to be a global social problem. As holders of WEEE, consumers have a significant effect on the recycling process. A consideration of and attention to the influence of consumer behavior in the recycling process can help achieve more effective recycling of WEEE. In this paper, we built a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain model composed of manufacturers, retailers, and network recycling platforms. Based on the influence of customer bargaining behavior, we studied several different scenarios of centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making, and contract coordination, using the Stackelberg game theory. The results show that retailers and network recycling platforms will reduce the direct recovery prices to maintain their own profit when considering the impact of consumer bargaining behavior, while remanufacturers will improve the transfer payment price for surrendering part of the profit under revenue and the expense sharing contract. Using this contract, we can achieve supply chain coordination and eliminate the effect of consumer bargaining behavior on supply chain performance. It can be viewed from the parameter sensitivity analysis that when we select the appropriate sharing coefficient, the closed-loop supply chain can achieve the same system performance under a centralized decision. MDPI 2017-12-15 2017-12 /pmc/articles/PMC5750996/ /pubmed/29244778 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph14121578 Text en © 2017 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Zhu, Xiaodong
Wang, Jing
Tang, Juan
Recycling Pricing and Coordination of WEEE Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Consumers’ Bargaining
title Recycling Pricing and Coordination of WEEE Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Consumers’ Bargaining
title_full Recycling Pricing and Coordination of WEEE Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Consumers’ Bargaining
title_fullStr Recycling Pricing and Coordination of WEEE Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Consumers’ Bargaining
title_full_unstemmed Recycling Pricing and Coordination of WEEE Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Consumers’ Bargaining
title_short Recycling Pricing and Coordination of WEEE Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Consumers’ Bargaining
title_sort recycling pricing and coordination of weee dual-channel closed-loop supply chain considering consumers’ bargaining
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5750996/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29244778
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph14121578
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