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Evolution of Cooperation with Heterogeneous Conditional Cooperators
Conditional cooperation declines over time if heterogeneous ideal conditional agents are involved in repeated interactions. With strict assumptions of rationality and a population consisting of ideal conditional agents who strictly follow a decision rule, cooperation is not expected. However, cooper...
Autores principales: | Battu, Balaraju, Pammi, V. S. Chandrasekhar, Srinivasan, Narayanan |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group UK
2018
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Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5852119/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29540725 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-22593-2 |
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