Contract Design: Risk Management and Evaluation

INTRODUCTION: Effective risk adjustment is an aspect that is more and more given weight on the background of competitive health insurance systems and vital healthcare systems. The risk structure of the providers plays a vital role in Pay for Performance. A prerequisite for optimal incentive-based service models is a (partial) dependence of the agent’s returns on the provider’s gain level. Integrated care systems as well as accountable care organisations (ACOs) in the US and similar concepts in other countries are advocated as an effective method of improving the performance of healthcare systems. These systems outline a payment and care delivery model that intends to tie provider reimbursements to predefined quality metrics. By this the total costs of care shall be reduced. METHODS: Little is known about the contractual design and the main challenges of delegating “accountability” to these new kinds of organisations and/or contracts. The costs of market utilisation are highly relevant for the conception of healthcare contracts; furthermore information asymmetries and contract-specific investments are an obstacle to the efficient operation of ACOs. A comprehensive literature review on methods of designing contracts in Integrated Care was conducted. The research question in this article focuses on how reimbursement strategies, evaluation of measures and methods of risk adjustment can best be integrated in healthcare contracting. RESULTS: Each integrated care contract includes challenges for both payers and providers without having sufficient empirical data on both sides. These challenges are clinical, administrative or financial nature. Risk adjusted contracts ensure that the reimbursement roughly matches the true costs resulting from the morbidity of a population. If reimbursement of care provider corresponds to the actual expenses for an individual/population the problem of risk selection is greatly reduced. The currently used methods of risk adjustment have widely differing model and forecast accuracy. For this reason, it is necessary to clearly regulate the method of risk adjustment in the integrated care contract. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION: The series of three articles on contract design has shown that coordination and motivation problems in designing healthcare contracts cannot be solved at no-costs. Moreover, it became clear, that complete contracts in healthcare are unrealistic and that contracts do always include certain uncertainties. These are based on the risk of random, and no contracting party can control these risks completely. It is also not possible to fully integrate these risks in the contract or to eliminate these risks by the parties.