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Carbon Emission Reduction with Capital Constraint under Greening Financing and Cost Sharing Contract

Motivated by the industrial practices, this work explores the carbon emission reductions for the manufacturer, while taking into account the capital constraint and the cap-and-trade regulation. To alleviate the capital constraint, two contracts are analyzed: greening financing and cost sharing. We u...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Qin, Juanjuan, Zhao, Yuhui, Xia, Liangjie
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5923792/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29652859
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph15040750
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author Qin, Juanjuan
Zhao, Yuhui
Xia, Liangjie
author_facet Qin, Juanjuan
Zhao, Yuhui
Xia, Liangjie
author_sort Qin, Juanjuan
collection PubMed
description Motivated by the industrial practices, this work explores the carbon emission reductions for the manufacturer, while taking into account the capital constraint and the cap-and-trade regulation. To alleviate the capital constraint, two contracts are analyzed: greening financing and cost sharing. We use the Stackelberg game to model four cases as follows: (1) in Case A1, the manufacturer has no greening financing and no cost sharing; (2) in Case A2, the manufacturer has greening financing, but no cost sharing; (3) in Case B1, the manufacturer has no greening financing but has cost sharing; and, (4) in Case B2, the manufacturer has greening financing and cost sharing. Then, using the backward induction method, we derive and compare the equilibrium decisions and profits of the participants in the four cases. We find that the interest rate of green finance does not always negatively affect the carbon emission reduction of the manufacturer. Meanwhile, the cost sharing from the retailer does not always positively affect the carbon emission reduction of the manufacturer. When the cost sharing is low, both of the participants’ profits in Case B1 (under no greening finance) are not less than that in Case B2 (under greening finance). When the cost sharing is high, both of the participants’ profits in Case B1 (under no greening finance) are less than that in Case B2 (under greening finance).
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spelling pubmed-59237922018-05-03 Carbon Emission Reduction with Capital Constraint under Greening Financing and Cost Sharing Contract Qin, Juanjuan Zhao, Yuhui Xia, Liangjie Int J Environ Res Public Health Article Motivated by the industrial practices, this work explores the carbon emission reductions for the manufacturer, while taking into account the capital constraint and the cap-and-trade regulation. To alleviate the capital constraint, two contracts are analyzed: greening financing and cost sharing. We use the Stackelberg game to model four cases as follows: (1) in Case A1, the manufacturer has no greening financing and no cost sharing; (2) in Case A2, the manufacturer has greening financing, but no cost sharing; (3) in Case B1, the manufacturer has no greening financing but has cost sharing; and, (4) in Case B2, the manufacturer has greening financing and cost sharing. Then, using the backward induction method, we derive and compare the equilibrium decisions and profits of the participants in the four cases. We find that the interest rate of green finance does not always negatively affect the carbon emission reduction of the manufacturer. Meanwhile, the cost sharing from the retailer does not always positively affect the carbon emission reduction of the manufacturer. When the cost sharing is low, both of the participants’ profits in Case B1 (under no greening finance) are not less than that in Case B2 (under greening finance). When the cost sharing is high, both of the participants’ profits in Case B1 (under no greening finance) are less than that in Case B2 (under greening finance). MDPI 2018-04-13 2018-04 /pmc/articles/PMC5923792/ /pubmed/29652859 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph15040750 Text en © 2018 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Qin, Juanjuan
Zhao, Yuhui
Xia, Liangjie
Carbon Emission Reduction with Capital Constraint under Greening Financing and Cost Sharing Contract
title Carbon Emission Reduction with Capital Constraint under Greening Financing and Cost Sharing Contract
title_full Carbon Emission Reduction with Capital Constraint under Greening Financing and Cost Sharing Contract
title_fullStr Carbon Emission Reduction with Capital Constraint under Greening Financing and Cost Sharing Contract
title_full_unstemmed Carbon Emission Reduction with Capital Constraint under Greening Financing and Cost Sharing Contract
title_short Carbon Emission Reduction with Capital Constraint under Greening Financing and Cost Sharing Contract
title_sort carbon emission reduction with capital constraint under greening financing and cost sharing contract
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5923792/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29652859
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph15040750
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