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Examining Spillovers between Long and Short Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games Played in the Laboratory

We had participants play two sets of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (RPD) games, one with a large continuation probability and the other with a small continuation probability, as well as Dictator Games (DGs) before and after the RPDs. We find that, regardless of which is RPD set is played first, partic...

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Autores principales: Arechar, Antonio A., Kouchaki, Maryam, Rand, David G.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: 2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5967855/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29809199
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9010005
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author Arechar, Antonio A.
Kouchaki, Maryam
Rand, David G.
author_facet Arechar, Antonio A.
Kouchaki, Maryam
Rand, David G.
author_sort Arechar, Antonio A.
collection PubMed
description We had participants play two sets of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (RPD) games, one with a large continuation probability and the other with a small continuation probability, as well as Dictator Games (DGs) before and after the RPDs. We find that, regardless of which is RPD set is played first, participants typically cooperate when the continuation probability is large and defect when the continuation probability is small. However, there is an asymmetry in behavior when transitioning from one continuation probability to the other. When switching from large to small, transient higher levels of cooperation are observed in the early games of the small continuation set. Conversely, when switching from small to large, cooperation is immediately high in the first game of the large continuation set. We also observe that response times increase when transitioning between sets of RPDs, except for altruistic participants transitioning into the set of RPDs with long continuation probabilities. These asymmetries suggest a bias in favor of cooperation. Finally, we examine the link between altruism and RPD play. We find that small continuation probability RPD play is correlated with giving in DGs played before and after the RPDs, whereas high continuation probability RPD play is not.
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spelling pubmed-59678552018-05-24 Examining Spillovers between Long and Short Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games Played in the Laboratory Arechar, Antonio A. Kouchaki, Maryam Rand, David G. Games (Basel) Article We had participants play two sets of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (RPD) games, one with a large continuation probability and the other with a small continuation probability, as well as Dictator Games (DGs) before and after the RPDs. We find that, regardless of which is RPD set is played first, participants typically cooperate when the continuation probability is large and defect when the continuation probability is small. However, there is an asymmetry in behavior when transitioning from one continuation probability to the other. When switching from large to small, transient higher levels of cooperation are observed in the early games of the small continuation set. Conversely, when switching from small to large, cooperation is immediately high in the first game of the large continuation set. We also observe that response times increase when transitioning between sets of RPDs, except for altruistic participants transitioning into the set of RPDs with long continuation probabilities. These asymmetries suggest a bias in favor of cooperation. Finally, we examine the link between altruism and RPD play. We find that small continuation probability RPD play is correlated with giving in DGs played before and after the RPDs, whereas high continuation probability RPD play is not. 2018-01-31 2018-03 /pmc/articles/PMC5967855/ /pubmed/29809199 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9010005 Text en Submitted for possible open access publication under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Arechar, Antonio A.
Kouchaki, Maryam
Rand, David G.
Examining Spillovers between Long and Short Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games Played in the Laboratory
title Examining Spillovers between Long and Short Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games Played in the Laboratory
title_full Examining Spillovers between Long and Short Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games Played in the Laboratory
title_fullStr Examining Spillovers between Long and Short Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games Played in the Laboratory
title_full_unstemmed Examining Spillovers between Long and Short Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games Played in the Laboratory
title_short Examining Spillovers between Long and Short Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games Played in the Laboratory
title_sort examining spillovers between long and short repeated prisoner’s dilemma games played in the laboratory
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5967855/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29809199
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9010005
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