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From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind

Predictive processing (PP) approaches to the mind are increasingly popular in the cognitive sciences. This surge of interest is accompanied by a proliferation of philosophical arguments, which seek to either extend or oppose various aspects of the emerging framework. In particular, the question of h...

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Autores principales: Allen, Micah, Friston, Karl J.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer Netherlands 2016
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5972168/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29887647
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1288-5
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author Allen, Micah
Friston, Karl J.
author_facet Allen, Micah
Friston, Karl J.
author_sort Allen, Micah
collection PubMed
description Predictive processing (PP) approaches to the mind are increasingly popular in the cognitive sciences. This surge of interest is accompanied by a proliferation of philosophical arguments, which seek to either extend or oppose various aspects of the emerging framework. In particular, the question of how to position predictive processing with respect to enactive and embodied cognition has become a topic of intense debate. While these arguments are certainly of valuable scientific and philosophical merit, they risk underestimating the variety of approaches gathered under the predictive label. Here, we first present a basic review of neuroscientific, cognitive, and philosophical approaches to PP, to illustrate how these range from solidly cognitivist applications—with a firm commitment to modular, internalistic mental representation—to more moderate views emphasizing the importance of ‘body-representations’, and finally to those which fit comfortably with radically enactive, embodied, and dynamic theories of mind. Any nascent predictive processing theory (e.g., of attention or consciousness) must take into account this continuum of views, and associated theoretical commitments. As a final point, we illustrate how the Free Energy Principle (FEP) attempts to dissolve tension between internalist and externalist accounts of cognition, by providing a formal synthetic account of how internal ‘representations’ arise from autopoietic self-organization. The FEP thus furnishes empirically productive process theories (e.g., predictive processing) by which to guide discovery through the formal modelling of the embodied mind.
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spelling pubmed-59721682018-06-08 From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind Allen, Micah Friston, Karl J. Synthese S.I. : Predictive Brains Predictive processing (PP) approaches to the mind are increasingly popular in the cognitive sciences. This surge of interest is accompanied by a proliferation of philosophical arguments, which seek to either extend or oppose various aspects of the emerging framework. In particular, the question of how to position predictive processing with respect to enactive and embodied cognition has become a topic of intense debate. While these arguments are certainly of valuable scientific and philosophical merit, they risk underestimating the variety of approaches gathered under the predictive label. Here, we first present a basic review of neuroscientific, cognitive, and philosophical approaches to PP, to illustrate how these range from solidly cognitivist applications—with a firm commitment to modular, internalistic mental representation—to more moderate views emphasizing the importance of ‘body-representations’, and finally to those which fit comfortably with radically enactive, embodied, and dynamic theories of mind. Any nascent predictive processing theory (e.g., of attention or consciousness) must take into account this continuum of views, and associated theoretical commitments. As a final point, we illustrate how the Free Energy Principle (FEP) attempts to dissolve tension between internalist and externalist accounts of cognition, by providing a formal synthetic account of how internal ‘representations’ arise from autopoietic self-organization. The FEP thus furnishes empirically productive process theories (e.g., predictive processing) by which to guide discovery through the formal modelling of the embodied mind. Springer Netherlands 2016-12-22 2018 /pmc/articles/PMC5972168/ /pubmed/29887647 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1288-5 Text en © The Author(s) 2016 Open AccessThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
spellingShingle S.I. : Predictive Brains
Allen, Micah
Friston, Karl J.
From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind
title From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind
title_full From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind
title_fullStr From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind
title_full_unstemmed From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind
title_short From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind
title_sort from cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind
topic S.I. : Predictive Brains
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5972168/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29887647
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1288-5
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