Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument

It is argued that the knowledge argument fails against externalist theories of mind. Enclosing Mary and cutting her off from some properties denies part of the physical world to Mary, which has the consequence of denying her certain kinds of physical knowledge. The externalist formulation of experie...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Skokowski, Paul
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer Netherlands 2017
Materias:
Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5986842/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29904436
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-017-0358-z
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author Skokowski, Paul
author_facet Skokowski, Paul
author_sort Skokowski, Paul
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description It is argued that the knowledge argument fails against externalist theories of mind. Enclosing Mary and cutting her off from some properties denies part of the physical world to Mary, which has the consequence of denying her certain kinds of physical knowledge. The externalist formulation of experience is shown to differ in vehicle, content, and causal role from the internalist version addressed by the knowledge argument, and is supported by results from neuroscience. This means that though the knowledge argument has some force against material internalists, it misses the mark entirely against externalist accounts.
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spelling pubmed-59868422018-06-12 Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument Skokowski, Paul Rev Philos Psychol Article It is argued that the knowledge argument fails against externalist theories of mind. Enclosing Mary and cutting her off from some properties denies part of the physical world to Mary, which has the consequence of denying her certain kinds of physical knowledge. The externalist formulation of experience is shown to differ in vehicle, content, and causal role from the internalist version addressed by the knowledge argument, and is supported by results from neuroscience. This means that though the knowledge argument has some force against material internalists, it misses the mark entirely against externalist accounts. Springer Netherlands 2017-09-07 2018 /pmc/articles/PMC5986842/ /pubmed/29904436 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-017-0358-z Text en © The Author(s) 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
spellingShingle Article
Skokowski, Paul
Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument
title Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument
title_full Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument
title_fullStr Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument
title_full_unstemmed Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument
title_short Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument
title_sort temperature, color and the brain: an externalist reply to the knowledge argument
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5986842/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29904436
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-017-0358-z
work_keys_str_mv AT skokowskipaul temperaturecolorandthebrainanexternalistreplytotheknowledgeargument

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