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When A+B < A: Cognitive Bias in Experts’ Judgment of Environmental Impact

When ‘environmentally friendly’ items are added to a set of conventional items, people report that the total set will have a lower environmental impact even though the actual impact increases. One hypothesis is that this “negative footprint illusion” arises because people, who are susceptible to the...

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Autores principales: Holmgren, Mattias, Kabanshi, Alan, Marsh, John E., Sörqvist, Patrik
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Frontiers Media S.A. 2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5987038/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29896142
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00823
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author Holmgren, Mattias
Kabanshi, Alan
Marsh, John E.
Sörqvist, Patrik
author_facet Holmgren, Mattias
Kabanshi, Alan
Marsh, John E.
Sörqvist, Patrik
author_sort Holmgren, Mattias
collection PubMed
description When ‘environmentally friendly’ items are added to a set of conventional items, people report that the total set will have a lower environmental impact even though the actual impact increases. One hypothesis is that this “negative footprint illusion” arises because people, who are susceptible to the illusion, lack necessary knowledge of the item’s actual environmental impact, perhaps coupled with a lack of mathematical skills. The study reported here addressed this hypothesis by recruiting participants (‘experts’) from a master’s program in energy systems, who thus have bachelor degrees in energy-related fields including academic training in mathematics. They were asked to estimate the number of trees needed to compensate for the environmental burden of two sets of buildings: one set of 150 buildings with conventional energy ratings and one set including the same 150 buildings but also 50 ‘green’ (energy-efficient) buildings. The experts reported that less trees were needed to compensate for the set with 150 conventional and 50 ‘green’ buildings compared to the set with only the 150 conventional buildings. This negative footprint illusion was as large in magnitude for the experts as it was for a group of novices without academic training in energy-related fields. We conclude that people are not immune to the negative footprint illusion even when they have the knowledge necessary to make accurate judgments.
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spelling pubmed-59870382018-06-12 When A+B < A: Cognitive Bias in Experts’ Judgment of Environmental Impact Holmgren, Mattias Kabanshi, Alan Marsh, John E. Sörqvist, Patrik Front Psychol Psychology When ‘environmentally friendly’ items are added to a set of conventional items, people report that the total set will have a lower environmental impact even though the actual impact increases. One hypothesis is that this “negative footprint illusion” arises because people, who are susceptible to the illusion, lack necessary knowledge of the item’s actual environmental impact, perhaps coupled with a lack of mathematical skills. The study reported here addressed this hypothesis by recruiting participants (‘experts’) from a master’s program in energy systems, who thus have bachelor degrees in energy-related fields including academic training in mathematics. They were asked to estimate the number of trees needed to compensate for the environmental burden of two sets of buildings: one set of 150 buildings with conventional energy ratings and one set including the same 150 buildings but also 50 ‘green’ (energy-efficient) buildings. The experts reported that less trees were needed to compensate for the set with 150 conventional and 50 ‘green’ buildings compared to the set with only the 150 conventional buildings. This negative footprint illusion was as large in magnitude for the experts as it was for a group of novices without academic training in energy-related fields. We conclude that people are not immune to the negative footprint illusion even when they have the knowledge necessary to make accurate judgments. Frontiers Media S.A. 2018-05-29 /pmc/articles/PMC5987038/ /pubmed/29896142 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00823 Text en Copyright © 2018 Holmgren, Kabanshi, Marsh and Sörqvist. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
spellingShingle Psychology
Holmgren, Mattias
Kabanshi, Alan
Marsh, John E.
Sörqvist, Patrik
When A+B < A: Cognitive Bias in Experts’ Judgment of Environmental Impact
title When A+B < A: Cognitive Bias in Experts’ Judgment of Environmental Impact
title_full When A+B < A: Cognitive Bias in Experts’ Judgment of Environmental Impact
title_fullStr When A+B < A: Cognitive Bias in Experts’ Judgment of Environmental Impact
title_full_unstemmed When A+B < A: Cognitive Bias in Experts’ Judgment of Environmental Impact
title_short When A+B < A: Cognitive Bias in Experts’ Judgment of Environmental Impact
title_sort when a+b < a: cognitive bias in experts’ judgment of environmental impact
topic Psychology
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5987038/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29896142
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00823
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