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Environmental Economics for Environmental Protection

Environmental economics deals with the optimal allocation of production factors and correcting market failure in protecting the environment. Market failure occurs because of externalities, common property resources, and public goods. Environmental policy instruments include direct regulation, taxes/...

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Autores principales: van Ierland, Ekko, Brink, Corjan, Hordijk, Leen, Kroeze, Carolien
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: TheScientificWorldJOURNAL 2002
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6009714/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12805909
http://dx.doi.org/10.1100/tsw.2002.289
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author van Ierland, Ekko
Brink, Corjan
Hordijk, Leen
Kroeze, Carolien
author_facet van Ierland, Ekko
Brink, Corjan
Hordijk, Leen
Kroeze, Carolien
author_sort van Ierland, Ekko
collection PubMed
description Environmental economics deals with the optimal allocation of production factors and correcting market failure in protecting the environment. Market failure occurs because of externalities, common property resources, and public goods. Environmental policy instruments include direct regulation, taxes/subsidies, tradable permits, deposit systems, voluntary agreements, and persuasion. Environmental policies usually focus on one pollutant or environmental issue but may have substantial impacts on other emissions and environmental problems. Neglecting these impacts will result in suboptimal policies. We present an integrated optimisation model for determining cost-effective strategies to simultaneously reduce emissions of several pollutants from several sources, allowing for interrelations between sources and abatement options. Our integrated approach in regard to acidifying compounds and greenhouse gases will be able to provide cost-effective policy options that will result in lower overall abatement costs. This paper shows that efficient emission reduction can be calculated, but we argue that, for transboundary air pollution and climate change, it is difficult to implement the socially optimal solution because strong incentives exist for “free-riding”. In order to implement efficient policies, international environmental agree-ments like the Gothenburg or the Kyoto Protocol are necessary to establish stable coalitions. The stability of these agreements depends on the distribution of costs and benefits over countries and on the redistribution of the gains of cooperation.
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spelling pubmed-60097142018-07-04 Environmental Economics for Environmental Protection van Ierland, Ekko Brink, Corjan Hordijk, Leen Kroeze, Carolien ScientificWorldJournal Short Communication Environmental economics deals with the optimal allocation of production factors and correcting market failure in protecting the environment. Market failure occurs because of externalities, common property resources, and public goods. Environmental policy instruments include direct regulation, taxes/subsidies, tradable permits, deposit systems, voluntary agreements, and persuasion. Environmental policies usually focus on one pollutant or environmental issue but may have substantial impacts on other emissions and environmental problems. Neglecting these impacts will result in suboptimal policies. We present an integrated optimisation model for determining cost-effective strategies to simultaneously reduce emissions of several pollutants from several sources, allowing for interrelations between sources and abatement options. Our integrated approach in regard to acidifying compounds and greenhouse gases will be able to provide cost-effective policy options that will result in lower overall abatement costs. This paper shows that efficient emission reduction can be calculated, but we argue that, for transboundary air pollution and climate change, it is difficult to implement the socially optimal solution because strong incentives exist for “free-riding”. In order to implement efficient policies, international environmental agree-ments like the Gothenburg or the Kyoto Protocol are necessary to establish stable coalitions. The stability of these agreements depends on the distribution of costs and benefits over countries and on the redistribution of the gains of cooperation. TheScientificWorldJOURNAL 2002-05-10 /pmc/articles/PMC6009714/ /pubmed/12805909 http://dx.doi.org/10.1100/tsw.2002.289 Text en Copyright © 2002 Ekko van Ierland et al. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
spellingShingle Short Communication
van Ierland, Ekko
Brink, Corjan
Hordijk, Leen
Kroeze, Carolien
Environmental Economics for Environmental Protection
title Environmental Economics for Environmental Protection
title_full Environmental Economics for Environmental Protection
title_fullStr Environmental Economics for Environmental Protection
title_full_unstemmed Environmental Economics for Environmental Protection
title_short Environmental Economics for Environmental Protection
title_sort environmental economics for environmental protection
topic Short Communication
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6009714/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12805909
http://dx.doi.org/10.1100/tsw.2002.289
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