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Toleration games: compensatory growth by plants in response to enemy attack is an evolutionarily stable strategy
Damage to plants from natural enemies is a ubiquitous feature of the natural world. Accordingly, plants have evolved a variety of strategies to deal with attack from enemies including the ability to simply tolerate attack. Tolerance often involves some form of compensatory response, such as the regr...
Autores principales: | McNickle, Gordon G, Evans, Wesley D |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Oxford University Press
2018
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6041949/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30018756 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aobpla/ply035 |
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