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Berg on Belief Reports
Jonathan Berg’s insightful and lucid book Direct Belief develops a pragmatic account of our intuitions about Frege-cases. More precisely Berg argues that our practice of belief-reporting normally exhibits certain regularities. He argues that utterances of belief reports typically conversationally im...
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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Springer Netherlands
2016
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Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6086227/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30147158 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9755-2 |
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author | Everett, Anthony |
author_facet | Everett, Anthony |
author_sort | Everett, Anthony |
collection | PubMed |
description | Jonathan Berg’s insightful and lucid book Direct Belief develops a pragmatic account of our intuitions about Frege-cases. More precisely Berg argues that our practice of belief-reporting normally exhibits certain regularities. He argues that utterances of belief reports typically conversationally implicate that the reports adhere to these regularities. And he uses these implicatures to explain our intuitions about Frege-cases. I explore and unpack Berg’s pragmatic account, considering and offering responses to three natural worries that might be raised. In particular, I respond to the objection that the regularities Berg invokes cannot generate the conversational implicatures he claims. I respond to the objection that the regularities Berg invokes do not, in fact, obtain. And I respond to the worry that Berg cannot explain how these regularities might arise in the first place. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-6086227 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2016 |
publisher | Springer Netherlands |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-60862272018-08-23 Berg on Belief Reports Everett, Anthony Philosophia (Ramat Gan) Article Jonathan Berg’s insightful and lucid book Direct Belief develops a pragmatic account of our intuitions about Frege-cases. More precisely Berg argues that our practice of belief-reporting normally exhibits certain regularities. He argues that utterances of belief reports typically conversationally implicate that the reports adhere to these regularities. And he uses these implicatures to explain our intuitions about Frege-cases. I explore and unpack Berg’s pragmatic account, considering and offering responses to three natural worries that might be raised. In particular, I respond to the objection that the regularities Berg invokes cannot generate the conversational implicatures he claims. I respond to the objection that the regularities Berg invokes do not, in fact, obtain. And I respond to the worry that Berg cannot explain how these regularities might arise in the first place. Springer Netherlands 2016-09-05 2017 /pmc/articles/PMC6086227/ /pubmed/30147158 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9755-2 Text en © The Author(s) 2016 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. |
spellingShingle | Article Everett, Anthony Berg on Belief Reports |
title | Berg on Belief Reports |
title_full | Berg on Belief Reports |
title_fullStr | Berg on Belief Reports |
title_full_unstemmed | Berg on Belief Reports |
title_short | Berg on Belief Reports |
title_sort | berg on belief reports |
topic | Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6086227/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30147158 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9755-2 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT everettanthony bergonbeliefreports |