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A Response to Coren’s Objections to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility
In this paper I respond to Coren’s argument against my 2016 paper in which I present a case for the principle of alternate possibilities as sufficient but not necessary for the ascription of moral responsibility (PAP((S))). I concede that Coren has identified aspects of my original position that are...
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
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Springer Netherlands
2017
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| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6086240/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30147177 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9819-y |