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Dismissing the Moral Sceptic: A Wittgensteinian Approach
Cartesian scepticism poses the question of how we can justify our belief that other humans experience consciousness in the same way that we do. Wittgenstein’s response to this scepticism is one that does not seek to resolve the problem by providing a sound argument against the Cartesian sceptic. Rat...
Autor principal: | Lawson-Frost, Sasha |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Springer Netherlands
2017
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6086241/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30147175 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9805-9 |
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