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Sensitivity has Multiple Heterogeneity Problems: a Reply to Wallbridge
In this paper, I defend the heterogeneity problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge against an objection that has been recently proposed by Wallbridge in Philosophia (2016b). I argue in (Melchior in Episteme, 12(4), 479–496, 2015) that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face a heterogeneity probl...
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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Springer Netherlands
2017
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Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6086259/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30147182 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9873-5 |
Sumario: | In this paper, I defend the heterogeneity problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge against an objection that has been recently proposed by Wallbridge in Philosophia (2016b). I argue in (Melchior in Episteme, 12(4), 479–496, 2015) that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face a heterogeneity problem when it comes to higher-level knowledge about the truth of one’s own beliefs. Beliefs in weaker higher-level propositions are insensitive, but beliefs in stronger higher-level propositions are sensitive. The resulting picture that we can know the stronger propositions without being in a position to know the weaker propositions is too heterogeneous to be plausible. Wallbridge objects that there is no heterogeneity problem because beliefs in the weaker higher-level propositions are also sensitive. I argue against Wallbridge that the heterogeneity problem is not solved but only displaced. Only some beliefs in the weaker higher-level propositions are sensitive. I conclude that the heterogeneity problem is one of a family of instability problems that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face and that Wallbridge’s account raises a further problem of this kind. |
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