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Punishing liars—How monitoring affects honesty and trust
Previous experiments have shown that the possibility to punish liars does not per se increase honesty in principal-agent relationships. In this study, we first establish a punishment mechanism that substantially enhances honest behavior and trust in a sender-receiver game: the possibility to impose...
Autores principales: | Behnk, Sascha, Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván, García-Gallego, Aurora |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2018
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6179269/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30304019 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205420 |
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