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An approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence

A table of 95% confidence limits on the probabilities for randomly downloading relatively small numbers of illegal images or sensitive documents amongst a relatively large number of other images or documents has been computed. It is anticipated that these data will assist prosecution officials in ar...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Overill, Richard E., Chow, Kam-Pui
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Taylor & Francis 2016
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6197133/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30483607
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20961790.2016.1253142
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author Overill, Richard E.
Chow, Kam-Pui
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Chow, Kam-Pui
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description A table of 95% confidence limits on the probabilities for randomly downloading relatively small numbers of illegal images or sensitive documents amongst a relatively large number of other images or documents has been computed. It is anticipated that these data will assist prosecution officials in arriving at a decision as to whether or not there is a reasonable likelihood of a successful criminal prosecution when the inadvertent download defence is employed in cases of possession of child pornography, terrorist material or espionage-related documents. The same data can also be used by defence counsels to assess the strength of the prosecution's case.
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spelling pubmed-61971332018-11-27 An approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence Overill, Richard E. Chow, Kam-Pui Forensic Sci Res Articles A table of 95% confidence limits on the probabilities for randomly downloading relatively small numbers of illegal images or sensitive documents amongst a relatively large number of other images or documents has been computed. It is anticipated that these data will assist prosecution officials in arriving at a decision as to whether or not there is a reasonable likelihood of a successful criminal prosecution when the inadvertent download defence is employed in cases of possession of child pornography, terrorist material or espionage-related documents. The same data can also be used by defence counsels to assess the strength of the prosecution's case. Taylor & Francis 2016-12-16 /pmc/articles/PMC6197133/ /pubmed/30483607 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20961790.2016.1253142 Text en © 2016 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis Group on behalf of the Institute of Forensic Science, Ministry of Justice, People's Republic of China. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
spellingShingle Articles
Overill, Richard E.
Chow, Kam-Pui
An approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence
title An approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence
title_full An approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence
title_fullStr An approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence
title_full_unstemmed An approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence
title_short An approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence
title_sort approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence
topic Articles
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6197133/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30483607
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20961790.2016.1253142
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