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An approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence
A table of 95% confidence limits on the probabilities for randomly downloading relatively small numbers of illegal images or sensitive documents amongst a relatively large number of other images or documents has been computed. It is anticipated that these data will assist prosecution officials in ar...
Autores principales: | , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Taylor & Francis
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6197133/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30483607 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20961790.2016.1253142 |
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author | Overill, Richard E. Chow, Kam-Pui |
author_facet | Overill, Richard E. Chow, Kam-Pui |
author_sort | Overill, Richard E. |
collection | PubMed |
description | A table of 95% confidence limits on the probabilities for randomly downloading relatively small numbers of illegal images or sensitive documents amongst a relatively large number of other images or documents has been computed. It is anticipated that these data will assist prosecution officials in arriving at a decision as to whether or not there is a reasonable likelihood of a successful criminal prosecution when the inadvertent download defence is employed in cases of possession of child pornography, terrorist material or espionage-related documents. The same data can also be used by defence counsels to assess the strength of the prosecution's case. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-6197133 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2016 |
publisher | Taylor & Francis |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-61971332018-11-27 An approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence Overill, Richard E. Chow, Kam-Pui Forensic Sci Res Articles A table of 95% confidence limits on the probabilities for randomly downloading relatively small numbers of illegal images or sensitive documents amongst a relatively large number of other images or documents has been computed. It is anticipated that these data will assist prosecution officials in arriving at a decision as to whether or not there is a reasonable likelihood of a successful criminal prosecution when the inadvertent download defence is employed in cases of possession of child pornography, terrorist material or espionage-related documents. The same data can also be used by defence counsels to assess the strength of the prosecution's case. Taylor & Francis 2016-12-16 /pmc/articles/PMC6197133/ /pubmed/30483607 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20961790.2016.1253142 Text en © 2016 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis Group on behalf of the Institute of Forensic Science, Ministry of Justice, People's Republic of China. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
spellingShingle | Articles Overill, Richard E. Chow, Kam-Pui An approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence |
title | An approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence |
title_full | An approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence |
title_fullStr | An approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence |
title_full_unstemmed | An approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence |
title_short | An approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence |
title_sort | approach to quantifying the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence |
topic | Articles |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6197133/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30483607 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20961790.2016.1253142 |
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