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Assessing the Risk of Vaccine-derived Outbreaks After Reintroduction of Oral Poliovirus Vaccine in Postcessation Settings
BACKGROUND: The Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013–2018 calls for the gradual withdrawal of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) from routine immunization. We aimed to quantify the transmission potential of Sabin strains from OPV when it is reintroduced, accidentally or deliberately, in a co...
Autores principales: | , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Oxford University Press
2018
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6206116/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30376087 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cid/ciy605 |
Sumario: | BACKGROUND: The Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013–2018 calls for the gradual withdrawal of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) from routine immunization. We aimed to quantify the transmission potential of Sabin strains from OPV when it is reintroduced, accidentally or deliberately, in a community vaccinated with inactivated poliovirus vaccine alone. METHODS: We built an individual-based stochastic epidemiological model that allows independent spread of 3 Sabin serotypes and differential transmission rates within versus between households. Model parameters were estimated by fitting to data from a prospective cohort in Mexico. We calculated the effective reproductive number for the Mexico cohort and simulated scenarios of Sabin strain resurgence under postcessation conditions, projecting the risk of prolonged circulation, which could lead to circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV). RESULTS: The estimated effective reproductive number for naturally infected individuals was about 1 for Sabin 2 and Sabin 3 (OPV2 and OPV3) in a postcessation setting. Most transmission events occurred between households. We estimated the probability of circulation for >9 months to be (1) <<1% for all 3 serotypes when 90% of children <5 years of age were vaccinated in a hypothetical outbreak control campaign; (2) 45% and 24% for Sabin 2 and Sabin 3, respectively, when vaccine coverage dropped to 10%; (3) 37% and 8% for Sabin 2 and Sabin 3, respectively, when a single active shedder appeared in a community. CONCLUSIONS: Critical factors determining the risk of cVDPV emergence are the scale at which OPV is reintroduced and the between-household transmission rate for poliovirus, with intermediate values posing the greatest risk. |
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