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1263. Managing an Influenza Outbreak Which Spilled Over to an Acute Care Hospital from a Behavioral Health Unit
BACKGROUND: Behavioral health units (BHU) have been implicated in influenza outbreaks due to group activities, low availability of alcohol-based hand gels and unique host factors. We describe the management of an unusual influenza outbreak, which started in the BHU and then spilled over to the acute...
Autores principales: | , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Oxford University Press
2018
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6252459/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ofid/ofy210.1096 |
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author | Clay, Colleen M Girio-Herrera, Leonardo Younus, Faheem |
author_facet | Clay, Colleen M Girio-Herrera, Leonardo Younus, Faheem |
author_sort | Clay, Colleen M |
collection | PubMed |
description | BACKGROUND: Behavioral health units (BHU) have been implicated in influenza outbreaks due to group activities, low availability of alcohol-based hand gels and unique host factors. We describe the management of an unusual influenza outbreak, which started in the BHU and then spilled over to the acute care hospital (ACH). METHODS: University of Maryland Harford Memorial Hospital is a 95-bed ACH with a 14-bed closed-door adult BHU located on the fifth floor. Two cases each of hospital-acquired influenza were identified in our BHU during 2016 and 2017. In January 2018, however, hospital-acquired influenza cases in the BHU spilled over to the adjacent ACH to cause an outbreak. A case was defined as a patient with fever of >100.4°F, presence of influenza-like illness, and a positive influenza test >72 hours after admission. Outbreak control measures included twice daily fever screening, enhanced droplet precautions, visitor restrictions, discontinuing community activities, enforcing hand hygiene at all hospital entrances, and hospital-wide chemoprophylaxis with oseltamivir. RESULTS: On January 15, 2018, the index patient developed influenza in the BHU followed by a second case in BHU 4-days later. Over the next 10 days, five more patients on the third and fourth floors of ACH tested positive. Attack rate was 3% and average length of stay was 8.9 days. Chemoprophylaxis with oseltamivir 75 mg orally once a day was given to 71% of all eligible hospitalized patients for a week (at a cost of $17,000). All seven patients yielded influenza A, subtype H3N2 and were successfully treated with oseltamivir 75 mg orally twice a day for 7 days. The outbreak lasted 11 days. Figure 1 shows the epidemiologic curve. CONCLUSION: Special attention should be paid to influenza prevention in the BHUs due to the risk of spillover effect to sicker patients in the adjacent ACH. A short, 7-day course of hospital-wide oseltamivir chemoprophylaxis, in addition to promptly implementing the infection prevention measures was effective in controlling the outbreak. [Image: see text] DISCLOSURES: All authors: No reported disclosures. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-6252459 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2018 |
publisher | Oxford University Press |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-62524592018-11-28 1263. Managing an Influenza Outbreak Which Spilled Over to an Acute Care Hospital from a Behavioral Health Unit Clay, Colleen M Girio-Herrera, Leonardo Younus, Faheem Open Forum Infect Dis Abstracts BACKGROUND: Behavioral health units (BHU) have been implicated in influenza outbreaks due to group activities, low availability of alcohol-based hand gels and unique host factors. We describe the management of an unusual influenza outbreak, which started in the BHU and then spilled over to the acute care hospital (ACH). METHODS: University of Maryland Harford Memorial Hospital is a 95-bed ACH with a 14-bed closed-door adult BHU located on the fifth floor. Two cases each of hospital-acquired influenza were identified in our BHU during 2016 and 2017. In January 2018, however, hospital-acquired influenza cases in the BHU spilled over to the adjacent ACH to cause an outbreak. A case was defined as a patient with fever of >100.4°F, presence of influenza-like illness, and a positive influenza test >72 hours after admission. Outbreak control measures included twice daily fever screening, enhanced droplet precautions, visitor restrictions, discontinuing community activities, enforcing hand hygiene at all hospital entrances, and hospital-wide chemoprophylaxis with oseltamivir. RESULTS: On January 15, 2018, the index patient developed influenza in the BHU followed by a second case in BHU 4-days later. Over the next 10 days, five more patients on the third and fourth floors of ACH tested positive. Attack rate was 3% and average length of stay was 8.9 days. Chemoprophylaxis with oseltamivir 75 mg orally once a day was given to 71% of all eligible hospitalized patients for a week (at a cost of $17,000). All seven patients yielded influenza A, subtype H3N2 and were successfully treated with oseltamivir 75 mg orally twice a day for 7 days. The outbreak lasted 11 days. Figure 1 shows the epidemiologic curve. CONCLUSION: Special attention should be paid to influenza prevention in the BHUs due to the risk of spillover effect to sicker patients in the adjacent ACH. A short, 7-day course of hospital-wide oseltamivir chemoprophylaxis, in addition to promptly implementing the infection prevention measures was effective in controlling the outbreak. [Image: see text] DISCLOSURES: All authors: No reported disclosures. Oxford University Press 2018-11-26 /pmc/articles/PMC6252459/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ofid/ofy210.1096 Text en © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Infectious Diseases Society of America. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact journals.permissions@oup.com |
spellingShingle | Abstracts Clay, Colleen M Girio-Herrera, Leonardo Younus, Faheem 1263. Managing an Influenza Outbreak Which Spilled Over to an Acute Care Hospital from a Behavioral Health Unit |
title | 1263. Managing an Influenza Outbreak Which Spilled Over to an Acute Care Hospital from a Behavioral Health Unit |
title_full | 1263. Managing an Influenza Outbreak Which Spilled Over to an Acute Care Hospital from a Behavioral Health Unit |
title_fullStr | 1263. Managing an Influenza Outbreak Which Spilled Over to an Acute Care Hospital from a Behavioral Health Unit |
title_full_unstemmed | 1263. Managing an Influenza Outbreak Which Spilled Over to an Acute Care Hospital from a Behavioral Health Unit |
title_short | 1263. Managing an Influenza Outbreak Which Spilled Over to an Acute Care Hospital from a Behavioral Health Unit |
title_sort | 1263. managing an influenza outbreak which spilled over to an acute care hospital from a behavioral health unit |
topic | Abstracts |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6252459/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ofid/ofy210.1096 |
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