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The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood

We summarize our recently introduced Projective Consciousness Model (PCM) (Rudrauf et al., 2017) and relate it to outstanding conceptual issues in the theory of consciousness. The PCM combines a projective geometrical model of the perspectival phenomenological structure of the field of consciousness...

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Autores principales: Williford, Kenneth, Bennequin, Daniel, Friston, Karl, Rudrauf, David
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Frontiers Media S.A. 2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6304424/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30618988
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02571
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author Williford, Kenneth
Bennequin, Daniel
Friston, Karl
Rudrauf, David
author_facet Williford, Kenneth
Bennequin, Daniel
Friston, Karl
Rudrauf, David
author_sort Williford, Kenneth
collection PubMed
description We summarize our recently introduced Projective Consciousness Model (PCM) (Rudrauf et al., 2017) and relate it to outstanding conceptual issues in the theory of consciousness. The PCM combines a projective geometrical model of the perspectival phenomenological structure of the field of consciousness with a variational Free Energy minimization model of active inference, yielding an account of the cybernetic function of consciousness, viz., the modulation of the field’s cognitive and affective dynamics for the effective control of embodied agents. The geometrical and active inference components are linked via the concept of projective transformation, which is crucial to understanding how conscious organisms integrate perception, emotion, memory, reasoning, and perspectival imagination in order to control behavior, enhance resilience, and optimize preference satisfaction. The PCM makes substantive empirical predictions and fits well into a (neuro)computationalist framework. It also helps us to account for aspects of subjective character that are sometimes ignored or conflated: pre-reflective self-consciousness, the first-person point of view, the sense of minenness or ownership, and social self-consciousness. We argue that the PCM, though still in development, offers us the most complete theory to date of what Thomas Metzinger has called “phenomenal selfhood.”
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spelling pubmed-63044242019-01-07 The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood Williford, Kenneth Bennequin, Daniel Friston, Karl Rudrauf, David Front Psychol Psychology We summarize our recently introduced Projective Consciousness Model (PCM) (Rudrauf et al., 2017) and relate it to outstanding conceptual issues in the theory of consciousness. The PCM combines a projective geometrical model of the perspectival phenomenological structure of the field of consciousness with a variational Free Energy minimization model of active inference, yielding an account of the cybernetic function of consciousness, viz., the modulation of the field’s cognitive and affective dynamics for the effective control of embodied agents. The geometrical and active inference components are linked via the concept of projective transformation, which is crucial to understanding how conscious organisms integrate perception, emotion, memory, reasoning, and perspectival imagination in order to control behavior, enhance resilience, and optimize preference satisfaction. The PCM makes substantive empirical predictions and fits well into a (neuro)computationalist framework. It also helps us to account for aspects of subjective character that are sometimes ignored or conflated: pre-reflective self-consciousness, the first-person point of view, the sense of minenness or ownership, and social self-consciousness. We argue that the PCM, though still in development, offers us the most complete theory to date of what Thomas Metzinger has called “phenomenal selfhood.” Frontiers Media S.A. 2018-12-17 /pmc/articles/PMC6304424/ /pubmed/30618988 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02571 Text en Copyright © 2018 Williford, Bennequin, Friston and Rudrauf. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
spellingShingle Psychology
Williford, Kenneth
Bennequin, Daniel
Friston, Karl
Rudrauf, David
The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood
title The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood
title_full The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood
title_fullStr The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood
title_full_unstemmed The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood
title_short The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood
title_sort projective consciousness model and phenomenal selfhood
topic Psychology
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6304424/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30618988
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02571
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