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One problem, too many solutions: How costly is honest signalling of need?
The “cost of begging” is a prominent prediction of costly signalling theory, suggesting that offspring begging has to be costly in order to be honest. Seminal signalling models predict that there is a unique equilibrium cost function for the offspring that results in honest signalling and this cost...
Autores principales: | Számadó, Szabolcs, Czégel, Dániel, Zachar, István |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2019
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6329501/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30633748 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0208443 |
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