Autonomy in altruistic surrogacy, conflicting kinship grammars and intentional multilineal kinship

Since 1982, when the first baby conceived by in-vitro fertilization (IVF) in Sweden was born, Swedish legislation on assisted reproduction has gradually become more liberal and inclusive. Today, gamete donation and IVF are permitted not only for heterosexual couples, but also for lesbian couples and single women, and embryo donation is expected to become legalized shortly which will further increase the chances for involuntarily childless people to become parents. In recent years, the possibility of allowing surrogacy has been debated increasingly, with strongly polarized arguments both for and against it. Recent reports by the Swedish National Council of Medical Ethics and a governmental investigation agreed that the possibilities for involuntarily childless people should be increased in several ways, but reached opposing conclusions concerning surrogacy. While the former argued in favour of it (in certain circumstances), the latter argued against it (in all circumstances). One difference in their argumentation centred around the issue of bodily autonomy and self-determination in surrogacy. These two opposing conclusions raise crucial questions about what the principle of reproductive intent implies for questions concerning reproductive autonomy in surrogacy. Does it matter when in the reproductive process the declaration of intent is made, and what happens if we consider the possibility of changing intentions in relation to autonomy and self-determination in surrogacy? Is the mater est rule compatible with an intersectional, queer and non-discriminatory approach to reproductive justice, and if so, under what circumstances? Are there any possibilities of thinking beyond the ‘either/or’ between these two principles?