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Spoofing Attack Results Determination in Code Domain Using a Spoofing Process Equation

When a user receiver is tracking an authentic signal, a spoofing signal can be transmitted to the user antenna. The question is under what conditions does the tracking point of the receiver move from the authentic signal to the spoofing signal? In this study, we develop a spoofing process equation (...

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Autores principales: Shin, Beomju, Park, Minhuck, Jeon, Sanghoon, So, Hyoungmin, Kim, Gapjin, Kee, Changdon
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6359678/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30642086
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s19020293
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author Shin, Beomju
Park, Minhuck
Jeon, Sanghoon
So, Hyoungmin
Kim, Gapjin
Kee, Changdon
author_facet Shin, Beomju
Park, Minhuck
Jeon, Sanghoon
So, Hyoungmin
Kim, Gapjin
Kee, Changdon
author_sort Shin, Beomju
collection PubMed
description When a user receiver is tracking an authentic signal, a spoofing signal can be transmitted to the user antenna. The question is under what conditions does the tracking point of the receiver move from the authentic signal to the spoofing signal? In this study, we develop a spoofing process equation (SPE) that can be used to calculate the tracking point of the delay lock loop (DLL) at regular chip intervals for the entire spoofing process. The condition for a successful spoofing signal is analyzed using the SPE. To derive the SPE, parameters, such as the signal strength, sweep velocity, loop filter order, and DLL bandwidth are considered. The success or failure of a spoofing attack is determined for a specific spoofing signal using the SPE. In addition, a correlation between each parameter for a successful spoofing attack could be obtained through the SPE. The simulation results show that the SPE performance is largely consistent with that of general DLL methods, even though the computational load of SPE is very low.
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spelling pubmed-63596782019-02-06 Spoofing Attack Results Determination in Code Domain Using a Spoofing Process Equation Shin, Beomju Park, Minhuck Jeon, Sanghoon So, Hyoungmin Kim, Gapjin Kee, Changdon Sensors (Basel) Article When a user receiver is tracking an authentic signal, a spoofing signal can be transmitted to the user antenna. The question is under what conditions does the tracking point of the receiver move from the authentic signal to the spoofing signal? In this study, we develop a spoofing process equation (SPE) that can be used to calculate the tracking point of the delay lock loop (DLL) at regular chip intervals for the entire spoofing process. The condition for a successful spoofing signal is analyzed using the SPE. To derive the SPE, parameters, such as the signal strength, sweep velocity, loop filter order, and DLL bandwidth are considered. The success or failure of a spoofing attack is determined for a specific spoofing signal using the SPE. In addition, a correlation between each parameter for a successful spoofing attack could be obtained through the SPE. The simulation results show that the SPE performance is largely consistent with that of general DLL methods, even though the computational load of SPE is very low. MDPI 2019-01-12 /pmc/articles/PMC6359678/ /pubmed/30642086 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s19020293 Text en © 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Shin, Beomju
Park, Minhuck
Jeon, Sanghoon
So, Hyoungmin
Kim, Gapjin
Kee, Changdon
Spoofing Attack Results Determination in Code Domain Using a Spoofing Process Equation
title Spoofing Attack Results Determination in Code Domain Using a Spoofing Process Equation
title_full Spoofing Attack Results Determination in Code Domain Using a Spoofing Process Equation
title_fullStr Spoofing Attack Results Determination in Code Domain Using a Spoofing Process Equation
title_full_unstemmed Spoofing Attack Results Determination in Code Domain Using a Spoofing Process Equation
title_short Spoofing Attack Results Determination in Code Domain Using a Spoofing Process Equation
title_sort spoofing attack results determination in code domain using a spoofing process equation
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6359678/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30642086
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s19020293
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