Cargando…
Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain
Cooperative strategies are predicted for repeated social interactions. The recently described Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies enforce the partner’s cooperation because the ‘generous’ ZD players help their cooperative partners while ‘extortionate’ ZD players exploit their partners’ cooperation. Part...
Autores principales: | Becks, Lutz, Milinski, Manfred |
---|---|
Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group UK
2019
|
Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6377637/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30770819 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-08671-7 |
Ejemplares similares
-
Asymmetric Power Boosts Extortion in an Economic Experiment
por: Hilbe, Christian, et al.
Publicado: (2016) -
Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner’s dilemma
por: Hilbe, Christian, et al.
Publicado: (2014) -
Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
por: Milinski, Manfred, et al.
Publicado: (2016) -
Quack Extortions—Toothache
Publicado: (1850) -
Adaptive Dynamics of Extortion and Compliance
por: Hilbe, Christian, et al.
Publicado: (2013)