Strategically Patrolling in a Chemical Cluster Addressing Gas Pollutants’ Releases through a Game-Theoretic Model

Chemical production activities in chemical clusters, if not well managed, will pose great threats to the surrounding air environment and impose great burden on emergency handling. Therefore, it is urgent and substantial in a chemical cluster to develop proper and suitable pollution controlling strategies for an inspection agency to monitor chemical production processes. Apart from the static monitoring resources (e.g., monitoring stations and gas sensor modules), patrolling by mobile vehicle resources is arranged for better detecting the illegal releasing behaviors of emission spots in different chemical plants. However, it has been proven that the commonly used patrolling strategies (i.e., the fixed route strategy and the purely randomized route strategy) are non-optimal and fail to interact with intelligent chemical plants. Therefore, we proposed the Chemical Cluster Environmental Protection Patrolling (CCEPP) game to tackle the problem in this paper. Through combining the source estimation process, the game is modeled to detect the illegal releasing behaviors of chemical plants by randomly and strategically arranging the patrolling routes and intensities in different chemical sites. In this game-theoretic model, players (patroller and chemical sites), strategies, payoffs, and game solvers are modeled in sequence. More importantly, this game model also considers traffic delays or bounded cognition of patrollers on patrolling plans. Therefore, a discrete Markov decision process was used to model this stochastic process. Further, the model is illustrated by a case study. Results imply that the patrolling strategy suggested by the CCEPP game outperforms both the fixed route strategy and the purely randomized route strategy.