Cargando…
Moral Bio-enhancement, Freedom, Value and the Parity Principle
A prominent objection to non-cognitive moral bio-enhancements (NCMBEs) is that they would compromise the recipient’s ‘freedom to fall’. I begin by discussing some ambiguities in this objection, before outlining an Aristotelian reading of it. I suggest that this reading may help to forestall Persson...
Autor principal: | Pugh, Jonathan |
---|---|
Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Springer Netherlands
2017
|
Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6428794/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30956373 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9482-8 |
Ejemplares similares
-
MORAL ENHANCEMENT AND FREEDOM
por: Harris, John
Publicado: (2011) -
The morality of freedom
por: Raz, Joseph
Publicado: (1986) -
Moral Bioenhancement, Freedom and Reason
por: Persson, Ingmar, et al.
Publicado: (2016) -
Freedom and moral sentiment : hume's way of naturalizing responsibility
por: Russell, Paul, 1955-
Publicado: (1995) -
AUTONOMY, NATALITY AND FREEDOM: A LIBERAL RE-EXAMINATION OF HABERMAS IN THE ENHANCEMENT DEBATE
por: Pugh, Jonathan
Publicado: (2015)