Framing effects on bribery behaviour: experimental evidence from China and Uganda

In this study we investigate the effect of framing on bribery behaviour. To do this, we replicate Barr and Serra (Exp Econ, 12(4):488–503, (2009) and carry out a simple one-shot bribery game that mimics corruption. In one treatment, we presented the experiment in a framed version, in which wording w...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Gaggero, Alessio, Appleton, Simon, Song, Lina
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer US 2018
Materias:
Replication Paper
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6435038/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30997321
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0049-2
Descripción
Sumario:In this study we investigate the effect of framing on bribery behaviour. To do this, we replicate Barr and Serra (Exp Econ, 12(4):488–503, (2009) and carry out a simple one-shot bribery game that mimics corruption. In one treatment, we presented the experiment in a framed version, in which wording was embedded with social context; in the other, we removed the social context and presented the game in a neutral manner. The contribution of this paper is that it offers a comparison of framing effects in two highly corrupt countries: China and Uganda. Our results provide evidence of strong and significant framing effects for Uganda, but not for China.

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