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No Intentions in the Brain: A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Science of Intention
In their paper “Why we may not find intentions in the brain,” Uithol et al. (2014) convincingly argue that “the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for.” Their paper could be seen as a critical...
Autor principal: | Kalis, Annemarie |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2019
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6499020/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31105629 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00946 |
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