Asymmetric Bargaining Model for Water Resource Allocation over Transboundary Rivers

Sustainable transboundary water governance is often challenged by conflicts between agents, which necessitates the design of cooperative and self-enforcing alternatives to facilitate equitable water distribution. The Nash bargaining approach, which originated from game theory, could offer a good mat...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Qin, Jianan, Fu, Xiang, Peng, Shaoming, Xu, Yuni, Huang, Jie, Huang, Sha
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2019
Materias:
Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6571634/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31100895
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16101733

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6571634/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31100895
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16101733

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