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Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents

Many industry leaders and academics from the field of machine ethics would have us believe that the inevitability of robots coming to have a larger role in our lives demands that robots be endowed with moral reasoning capabilities. Robots endowed in this way may be referred to as artificial moral ag...

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Autores principales: van Wynsberghe, Aimee, Robbins, Scott
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer Netherlands 2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6591188/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29460081
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11948-018-0030-8
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author van Wynsberghe, Aimee
Robbins, Scott
author_facet van Wynsberghe, Aimee
Robbins, Scott
author_sort van Wynsberghe, Aimee
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description Many industry leaders and academics from the field of machine ethics would have us believe that the inevitability of robots coming to have a larger role in our lives demands that robots be endowed with moral reasoning capabilities. Robots endowed in this way may be referred to as artificial moral agents (AMA). Reasons often given for developing AMAs are: the prevention of harm, the necessity for public trust, the prevention of immoral use, such machines are better moral reasoners than humans, and building these machines would lead to a better understanding of human morality. Although some scholars have challenged the very initiative to develop AMAs, what is currently missing from the debate is a closer examination of the reasons offered by machine ethicists to justify the development of AMAs. This closer examination is especially needed because of the amount of funding currently being allocated to the development of AMAs (from funders like Elon Musk) coupled with the amount of attention researchers and industry leaders receive in the media for their efforts in this direction. The stakes in this debate are high because moral robots would make demands on society; answers to a host of pending questions about what counts as an AMA and whether they are morally responsible for their behavior or not. This paper shifts the burden of proof back to the machine ethicists demanding that they give good reasons to build AMAs. The paper argues that until this is done, the development of commercially available AMAs should not proceed further.
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spelling pubmed-65911882019-07-11 Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents van Wynsberghe, Aimee Robbins, Scott Sci Eng Ethics Original Paper Many industry leaders and academics from the field of machine ethics would have us believe that the inevitability of robots coming to have a larger role in our lives demands that robots be endowed with moral reasoning capabilities. Robots endowed in this way may be referred to as artificial moral agents (AMA). Reasons often given for developing AMAs are: the prevention of harm, the necessity for public trust, the prevention of immoral use, such machines are better moral reasoners than humans, and building these machines would lead to a better understanding of human morality. Although some scholars have challenged the very initiative to develop AMAs, what is currently missing from the debate is a closer examination of the reasons offered by machine ethicists to justify the development of AMAs. This closer examination is especially needed because of the amount of funding currently being allocated to the development of AMAs (from funders like Elon Musk) coupled with the amount of attention researchers and industry leaders receive in the media for their efforts in this direction. The stakes in this debate are high because moral robots would make demands on society; answers to a host of pending questions about what counts as an AMA and whether they are morally responsible for their behavior or not. This paper shifts the burden of proof back to the machine ethicists demanding that they give good reasons to build AMAs. The paper argues that until this is done, the development of commercially available AMAs should not proceed further. Springer Netherlands 2018-02-19 2019 /pmc/articles/PMC6591188/ /pubmed/29460081 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11948-018-0030-8 Text en © The Author(s) 2018 Open AccessThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
spellingShingle Original Paper
van Wynsberghe, Aimee
Robbins, Scott
Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents
title Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents
title_full Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents
title_fullStr Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents
title_full_unstemmed Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents
title_short Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents
title_sort critiquing the reasons for making artificial moral agents
topic Original Paper
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6591188/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29460081
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11948-018-0030-8
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