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A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors

In this paper, we developed a dynamic price game model for a low-carbon, closed-loop supply chain system in which (1) the manufacturer had fairness concern and carbon emission reduction (CER) behaviors, and market share and profit maximization were their objectives, and (2) the retailer showed fairn...

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Autores principales: Li, Qiuxiang, Shi, Mengnan, Huang, Yimin
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6603963/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31167400
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16111978
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author Li, Qiuxiang
Shi, Mengnan
Huang, Yimin
author_facet Li, Qiuxiang
Shi, Mengnan
Huang, Yimin
author_sort Li, Qiuxiang
collection PubMed
description In this paper, we developed a dynamic price game model for a low-carbon, closed-loop supply chain system in which (1) the manufacturer had fairness concern and carbon emission reduction (CER) behaviors, and market share and profit maximization were their objectives, and (2) the retailer showed fairness concern behaviors in market competition and provided service input to reduce return rates. The retailer recycled old products from customers, and the manufacturer remanufactured the recycled old products. The effects of different parameter values on the stability and utility of the dynamic price game model were determined through analysis and numerical simulation. Results found that an increasing customer loyalty to the direct marketing channel decreased the stable region of the manufacturer’s price adjustment and increase that of the retailer. The stable region of the system shrank with an increase of CER and the retailer’s service level, which expanded with return rates. The dynamic system entered into chaos through flip bifurcation with the increase of price adjustment speed. In the chaotic state, the average utilities of the manufacturer and retailer all declined, while that of the retailer declined even more. Changes to parameter values had a great impact on the utilities of the manufacturer and retailer. By selecting appropriate control parameters, the dynamic system can return to a stable state from chaos again. The research of this paper is of great significance to participants’ price decision-making and supply chain operation management.
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spelling pubmed-66039632019-07-19 A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors Li, Qiuxiang Shi, Mengnan Huang, Yimin Int J Environ Res Public Health Article In this paper, we developed a dynamic price game model for a low-carbon, closed-loop supply chain system in which (1) the manufacturer had fairness concern and carbon emission reduction (CER) behaviors, and market share and profit maximization were their objectives, and (2) the retailer showed fairness concern behaviors in market competition and provided service input to reduce return rates. The retailer recycled old products from customers, and the manufacturer remanufactured the recycled old products. The effects of different parameter values on the stability and utility of the dynamic price game model were determined through analysis and numerical simulation. Results found that an increasing customer loyalty to the direct marketing channel decreased the stable region of the manufacturer’s price adjustment and increase that of the retailer. The stable region of the system shrank with an increase of CER and the retailer’s service level, which expanded with return rates. The dynamic system entered into chaos through flip bifurcation with the increase of price adjustment speed. In the chaotic state, the average utilities of the manufacturer and retailer all declined, while that of the retailer declined even more. Changes to parameter values had a great impact on the utilities of the manufacturer and retailer. By selecting appropriate control parameters, the dynamic system can return to a stable state from chaos again. The research of this paper is of great significance to participants’ price decision-making and supply chain operation management. MDPI 2019-06-04 2019-06 /pmc/articles/PMC6603963/ /pubmed/31167400 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16111978 Text en © 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Li, Qiuxiang
Shi, Mengnan
Huang, Yimin
A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors
title A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors
title_full A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors
title_fullStr A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors
title_full_unstemmed A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors
title_short A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors
title_sort dynamic price game model in a low-carbon, closed-loop supply chain considering return rates and fairness concern behaviors
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6603963/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31167400
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16111978
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