Cargando…

On DNA Signatures, Their Dual-Use Potential for GMO Counterfeiting, and a Cyber-Based Security Solution

This study investigates the role and functionality of special nucleotide sequences (“DNA signatures”) to detect the presence of an organism and to distinguish it from all others. After highlighting vulnerabilities of the prevalent DNA signature paradigm for the identification of agricultural genetic...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Mueller, Siguna
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Frontiers Media S.A. 2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6693310/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31440503
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fbioe.2019.00189
_version_ 1783443689264119808
author Mueller, Siguna
author_facet Mueller, Siguna
author_sort Mueller, Siguna
collection PubMed
description This study investigates the role and functionality of special nucleotide sequences (“DNA signatures”) to detect the presence of an organism and to distinguish it from all others. After highlighting vulnerabilities of the prevalent DNA signature paradigm for the identification of agricultural genetically modified (GM) organisms it will be argued that these so-called signatures really are no signatures at all - when compared to the notion of traditional (handwritten) signatures and their generalizations in the modern (digital) world. It is suggested that a recent contamination event of an unauthorized GM Bacillus subtilis strain (Paracchini et al., 2017) in Europe could have been—or the same way could be - the consequence of exploiting gaps of prevailing DNA signatures. Moreover, a recent study (Mueller, 2019) proposes that such DNA signatures may intentionally be exploited to support the counterfeiting or even weaponization of GM organisms (GMOs). These concerns mandate a re-conceptualization of how DNA signatures need to be realized. After identifying central issues of the new vulnerabilities and overlying them with practical challenges that bio-cyber hackers would be facing, recommendations are made how DNA signatures may be enhanced. To overcome the core problem of signature transferability in bioengineered mediums, it is necessary that the identifier needs to remain secret during the entire verification process. On the other hand, however, the goal of DNA signatures is to enable public verifiability, leading to a paradoxical dilemma. It is shown that this can be addressed with ideas that underlie special cryptographic signatures, in particular those of “zero-knowledge” and “invisibility.” This means more than mere signature hiding, but relies on a knowledge-based proof and differentiation of a secret (here, as assigned to specific clones) which can be realized without explicit demonstration of that secret. A re-conceptualization of these principles can be used in form of a combined (digital and physical) method to establish confidentiality and prevent un-impersonation of the manufacturer. As a result, this helps mitigate the circulation of possibly hazardous GMO counterfeits and also addresses the situation whereby attackers try to blame producers for deliberately implanting illicit adulterations hidden within authorized GMOs.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-6693310
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2019
publisher Frontiers Media S.A.
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-66933102019-08-22 On DNA Signatures, Their Dual-Use Potential for GMO Counterfeiting, and a Cyber-Based Security Solution Mueller, Siguna Front Bioeng Biotechnol Bioengineering and Biotechnology This study investigates the role and functionality of special nucleotide sequences (“DNA signatures”) to detect the presence of an organism and to distinguish it from all others. After highlighting vulnerabilities of the prevalent DNA signature paradigm for the identification of agricultural genetically modified (GM) organisms it will be argued that these so-called signatures really are no signatures at all - when compared to the notion of traditional (handwritten) signatures and their generalizations in the modern (digital) world. It is suggested that a recent contamination event of an unauthorized GM Bacillus subtilis strain (Paracchini et al., 2017) in Europe could have been—or the same way could be - the consequence of exploiting gaps of prevailing DNA signatures. Moreover, a recent study (Mueller, 2019) proposes that such DNA signatures may intentionally be exploited to support the counterfeiting or even weaponization of GM organisms (GMOs). These concerns mandate a re-conceptualization of how DNA signatures need to be realized. After identifying central issues of the new vulnerabilities and overlying them with practical challenges that bio-cyber hackers would be facing, recommendations are made how DNA signatures may be enhanced. To overcome the core problem of signature transferability in bioengineered mediums, it is necessary that the identifier needs to remain secret during the entire verification process. On the other hand, however, the goal of DNA signatures is to enable public verifiability, leading to a paradoxical dilemma. It is shown that this can be addressed with ideas that underlie special cryptographic signatures, in particular those of “zero-knowledge” and “invisibility.” This means more than mere signature hiding, but relies on a knowledge-based proof and differentiation of a secret (here, as assigned to specific clones) which can be realized without explicit demonstration of that secret. A re-conceptualization of these principles can be used in form of a combined (digital and physical) method to establish confidentiality and prevent un-impersonation of the manufacturer. As a result, this helps mitigate the circulation of possibly hazardous GMO counterfeits and also addresses the situation whereby attackers try to blame producers for deliberately implanting illicit adulterations hidden within authorized GMOs. Frontiers Media S.A. 2019-08-07 /pmc/articles/PMC6693310/ /pubmed/31440503 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fbioe.2019.00189 Text en Copyright © 2019 Mueller. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
spellingShingle Bioengineering and Biotechnology
Mueller, Siguna
On DNA Signatures, Their Dual-Use Potential for GMO Counterfeiting, and a Cyber-Based Security Solution
title On DNA Signatures, Their Dual-Use Potential for GMO Counterfeiting, and a Cyber-Based Security Solution
title_full On DNA Signatures, Their Dual-Use Potential for GMO Counterfeiting, and a Cyber-Based Security Solution
title_fullStr On DNA Signatures, Their Dual-Use Potential for GMO Counterfeiting, and a Cyber-Based Security Solution
title_full_unstemmed On DNA Signatures, Their Dual-Use Potential for GMO Counterfeiting, and a Cyber-Based Security Solution
title_short On DNA Signatures, Their Dual-Use Potential for GMO Counterfeiting, and a Cyber-Based Security Solution
title_sort on dna signatures, their dual-use potential for gmo counterfeiting, and a cyber-based security solution
topic Bioengineering and Biotechnology
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6693310/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31440503
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fbioe.2019.00189
work_keys_str_mv AT muellersiguna ondnasignaturestheirdualusepotentialforgmocounterfeitingandacyberbasedsecuritysolution