Cargando…

An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms

In recent years, with the rapid development of the economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for industrial pollution between the local governments and enterprises to study the dynamic evolution path of a game system an...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Wang, Chuansheng, Shi, Fulei
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6696192/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31382549
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16152775
_version_ 1783444212631470080
author Wang, Chuansheng
Shi, Fulei
author_facet Wang, Chuansheng
Shi, Fulei
author_sort Wang, Chuansheng
collection PubMed
description In recent years, with the rapid development of the economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for industrial pollution between the local governments and enterprises to study the dynamic evolution path of a game system and the evolutionary stable strategy under two punishment mechanisms. The results show that, in a static punishment mechanism (SPM), the strategy between governments and enterprises is uncertain. Moreover, the evolutionary trajectory between governments and enterprises is uncertain. However, under the dynamic punishment mechanism (DPM), the evolution path between governments and enterprises tends to converge to a stable value. Thus, the DPM is more conducive than the SPM for industrial pollution control.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-6696192
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2019
publisher MDPI
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-66961922019-09-05 An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms Wang, Chuansheng Shi, Fulei Int J Environ Res Public Health Article In recent years, with the rapid development of the economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for industrial pollution between the local governments and enterprises to study the dynamic evolution path of a game system and the evolutionary stable strategy under two punishment mechanisms. The results show that, in a static punishment mechanism (SPM), the strategy between governments and enterprises is uncertain. Moreover, the evolutionary trajectory between governments and enterprises is uncertain. However, under the dynamic punishment mechanism (DPM), the evolution path between governments and enterprises tends to converge to a stable value. Thus, the DPM is more conducive than the SPM for industrial pollution control. MDPI 2019-08-03 2019-08 /pmc/articles/PMC6696192/ /pubmed/31382549 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16152775 Text en © 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Wang, Chuansheng
Shi, Fulei
An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms
title An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms
title_full An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms
title_fullStr An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms
title_full_unstemmed An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms
title_short An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms
title_sort evolutionary game model for industrial pollution management under two punishment mechanisms
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6696192/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31382549
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16152775
work_keys_str_mv AT wangchuansheng anevolutionarygamemodelforindustrialpollutionmanagementundertwopunishmentmechanisms
AT shifulei anevolutionarygamemodelforindustrialpollutionmanagementundertwopunishmentmechanisms
AT wangchuansheng evolutionarygamemodelforindustrialpollutionmanagementundertwopunishmentmechanisms
AT shifulei evolutionarygamemodelforindustrialpollutionmanagementundertwopunishmentmechanisms