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Why we don’t always punish: Preferences for non-punitive responses to moral violations

While decades of research demonstrate that people punish unfair treatment, recent work illustrates that alternative, non-punitive responses may also be preferred. Across five studies (N = 1,010) we examine non-punitive methods for restoring justice. We find that in the wake of a fairness violation,...

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Autores principales: Heffner, Joseph, FeldmanHall, Oriel
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Nature Publishing Group UK 2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6744396/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31519991
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-49680-2
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author Heffner, Joseph
FeldmanHall, Oriel
author_facet Heffner, Joseph
FeldmanHall, Oriel
author_sort Heffner, Joseph
collection PubMed
description While decades of research demonstrate that people punish unfair treatment, recent work illustrates that alternative, non-punitive responses may also be preferred. Across five studies (N = 1,010) we examine non-punitive methods for restoring justice. We find that in the wake of a fairness violation, compensation is preferred to punishment, and once maximal compensation is available, punishment is no longer the favored response. Furthermore, compensating the victim—as a method for restoring justice—also generalizes to judgments of more severe crimes: participants allocate more compensation to the victim as perceived severity of the crime increases. Why might someone refrain from punishing a perpetrator? We investigate one possible explanation, finding that punishment acts as a conduit for different moral signals depending on the social context in which it arises. When choosing partners for social exchange, there are stronger preferences for those who previously punished as third-party observers but not those who punished as victims. This is in part because third-parties are perceived as relatively more moral when they punish, while victims are not. Together, these findings demonstrate that non-punitive alternatives can act as effective avenues for restoring justice, while also highlighting that moral reputation hinges on whether punishment is enacted by victims or third-parties.
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spelling pubmed-67443962019-09-27 Why we don’t always punish: Preferences for non-punitive responses to moral violations Heffner, Joseph FeldmanHall, Oriel Sci Rep Article While decades of research demonstrate that people punish unfair treatment, recent work illustrates that alternative, non-punitive responses may also be preferred. Across five studies (N = 1,010) we examine non-punitive methods for restoring justice. We find that in the wake of a fairness violation, compensation is preferred to punishment, and once maximal compensation is available, punishment is no longer the favored response. Furthermore, compensating the victim—as a method for restoring justice—also generalizes to judgments of more severe crimes: participants allocate more compensation to the victim as perceived severity of the crime increases. Why might someone refrain from punishing a perpetrator? We investigate one possible explanation, finding that punishment acts as a conduit for different moral signals depending on the social context in which it arises. When choosing partners for social exchange, there are stronger preferences for those who previously punished as third-party observers but not those who punished as victims. This is in part because third-parties are perceived as relatively more moral when they punish, while victims are not. Together, these findings demonstrate that non-punitive alternatives can act as effective avenues for restoring justice, while also highlighting that moral reputation hinges on whether punishment is enacted by victims or third-parties. Nature Publishing Group UK 2019-09-13 /pmc/articles/PMC6744396/ /pubmed/31519991 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-49680-2 Text en © The Author(s) 2019 Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
spellingShingle Article
Heffner, Joseph
FeldmanHall, Oriel
Why we don’t always punish: Preferences for non-punitive responses to moral violations
title Why we don’t always punish: Preferences for non-punitive responses to moral violations
title_full Why we don’t always punish: Preferences for non-punitive responses to moral violations
title_fullStr Why we don’t always punish: Preferences for non-punitive responses to moral violations
title_full_unstemmed Why we don’t always punish: Preferences for non-punitive responses to moral violations
title_short Why we don’t always punish: Preferences for non-punitive responses to moral violations
title_sort why we don’t always punish: preferences for non-punitive responses to moral violations
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6744396/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31519991
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-49680-2
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