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DOMtegrity: ensuring web page integrity against malicious browser extensions

In this paper, we address an unsolved problem in the real world: how to ensure the integrity of the web content in a browser in the presence of malicious browser extensions? The problem of exposing confidential user credentials to malicious extensions has been widely understood, which has prompted m...

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Autores principales: Toreini, Ehsan, Shahandashti, Siamak F., Mehrnezhad, Maryam, Hao, Feng
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6777511/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31632229
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10207-019-00442-1
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author Toreini, Ehsan
Shahandashti, Siamak F.
Mehrnezhad, Maryam
Hao, Feng
author_facet Toreini, Ehsan
Shahandashti, Siamak F.
Mehrnezhad, Maryam
Hao, Feng
author_sort Toreini, Ehsan
collection PubMed
description In this paper, we address an unsolved problem in the real world: how to ensure the integrity of the web content in a browser in the presence of malicious browser extensions? The problem of exposing confidential user credentials to malicious extensions has been widely understood, which has prompted major banks to deploy two-factor authentication. However, the importance of the “integrity” of the web content has received little attention. We implement two attacks on real-world online banking websites and show that ignoring the “integrity” of the web content can fundamentally defeat two-factor solutions. To address this problem, we propose a cryptographic protocol called DOMtegrity to ensure the end-to-end integrity of the DOM structure of a web page from delivering at a web server to the rendering of the page in the user’s browser. DOMtegrity is the first solution that protects DOM integrity without modifying the browser architecture or requiring extra hardware. It works by exploiting subtle yet important differences between browser extensions and in-line JavaScript code. We show how DOMtegrity prevents the earlier attacks and a whole range of man-in-the-browser attacks. We conduct extensive experiments on more than 14,000 real-world extensions to evaluate the effectiveness of DOMtegrity.
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spelling pubmed-67775112019-10-17 DOMtegrity: ensuring web page integrity against malicious browser extensions Toreini, Ehsan Shahandashti, Siamak F. Mehrnezhad, Maryam Hao, Feng Int J Inf Secur Regular Contribution In this paper, we address an unsolved problem in the real world: how to ensure the integrity of the web content in a browser in the presence of malicious browser extensions? The problem of exposing confidential user credentials to malicious extensions has been widely understood, which has prompted major banks to deploy two-factor authentication. However, the importance of the “integrity” of the web content has received little attention. We implement two attacks on real-world online banking websites and show that ignoring the “integrity” of the web content can fundamentally defeat two-factor solutions. To address this problem, we propose a cryptographic protocol called DOMtegrity to ensure the end-to-end integrity of the DOM structure of a web page from delivering at a web server to the rendering of the page in the user’s browser. DOMtegrity is the first solution that protects DOM integrity without modifying the browser architecture or requiring extra hardware. It works by exploiting subtle yet important differences between browser extensions and in-line JavaScript code. We show how DOMtegrity prevents the earlier attacks and a whole range of man-in-the-browser attacks. We conduct extensive experiments on more than 14,000 real-world extensions to evaluate the effectiveness of DOMtegrity. Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2019-06-11 2019 /pmc/articles/PMC6777511/ /pubmed/31632229 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10207-019-00442-1 Text en © The Author(s) 2019 Open AccessThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
spellingShingle Regular Contribution
Toreini, Ehsan
Shahandashti, Siamak F.
Mehrnezhad, Maryam
Hao, Feng
DOMtegrity: ensuring web page integrity against malicious browser extensions
title DOMtegrity: ensuring web page integrity against malicious browser extensions
title_full DOMtegrity: ensuring web page integrity against malicious browser extensions
title_fullStr DOMtegrity: ensuring web page integrity against malicious browser extensions
title_full_unstemmed DOMtegrity: ensuring web page integrity against malicious browser extensions
title_short DOMtegrity: ensuring web page integrity against malicious browser extensions
title_sort domtegrity: ensuring web page integrity against malicious browser extensions
topic Regular Contribution
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6777511/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31632229
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10207-019-00442-1
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