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An Economic Model of Optimal Penalty for Health Care Workplace Violence
This article provides an economic model on the optimal penalty of health care workplace violence based on health care workplace classification and cost structure, aiming to deter potential offenders. By developing an EIP (externality, identifiability, and preventability) analytical method, we distin...
Autores principales: | , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
SAGE Publications
2019
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6811755/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31640449 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0046958019884190 |
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author | Sun, Zesheng Lin, Sharon X. Wang, Shuhong |
author_facet | Sun, Zesheng Lin, Sharon X. Wang, Shuhong |
author_sort | Sun, Zesheng |
collection | PubMed |
description | This article provides an economic model on the optimal penalty of health care workplace violence based on health care workplace classification and cost structure, aiming to deter potential offenders. By developing an EIP (externality, identifiability, and preventability) analytical method, we distinguish the characteristics of different workplaces and find that the health care workplace is the combination of externality, low identifiability, and low preventability. Besides the private cost to victims for ordinary workplace violence, the cost structure of health care workplace violence includes social costs like externality-related public safety cost, defensive medicine cost, and specific factors cost. When the optimal penalty corresponding to different levels of health care workplace violence increases, the threshold level of punishable violence decreases after incorporating the social costs into analysis. Our model shows that public safety costs are positively correlated with the importance of health care workplace in the service network, and a higher public safety cost should be matched with a greater optimal penalty. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-6811755 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2019 |
publisher | SAGE Publications |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-68117552019-11-05 An Economic Model of Optimal Penalty for Health Care Workplace Violence Sun, Zesheng Lin, Sharon X. Wang, Shuhong Inquiry Original Research This article provides an economic model on the optimal penalty of health care workplace violence based on health care workplace classification and cost structure, aiming to deter potential offenders. By developing an EIP (externality, identifiability, and preventability) analytical method, we distinguish the characteristics of different workplaces and find that the health care workplace is the combination of externality, low identifiability, and low preventability. Besides the private cost to victims for ordinary workplace violence, the cost structure of health care workplace violence includes social costs like externality-related public safety cost, defensive medicine cost, and specific factors cost. When the optimal penalty corresponding to different levels of health care workplace violence increases, the threshold level of punishable violence decreases after incorporating the social costs into analysis. Our model shows that public safety costs are positively correlated with the importance of health care workplace in the service network, and a higher public safety cost should be matched with a greater optimal penalty. SAGE Publications 2019-10-23 /pmc/articles/PMC6811755/ /pubmed/31640449 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0046958019884190 Text en © The Author(s) 2019 http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). |
spellingShingle | Original Research Sun, Zesheng Lin, Sharon X. Wang, Shuhong An Economic Model of Optimal Penalty for Health Care Workplace Violence |
title | An Economic Model of Optimal Penalty for Health Care Workplace
Violence |
title_full | An Economic Model of Optimal Penalty for Health Care Workplace
Violence |
title_fullStr | An Economic Model of Optimal Penalty for Health Care Workplace
Violence |
title_full_unstemmed | An Economic Model of Optimal Penalty for Health Care Workplace
Violence |
title_short | An Economic Model of Optimal Penalty for Health Care Workplace
Violence |
title_sort | economic model of optimal penalty for health care workplace
violence |
topic | Original Research |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6811755/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31640449 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0046958019884190 |
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